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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to examine the Vosges Mountain Campaign of World 
War II to better the fighting in southern France between the Wehrmacht and the Allies in 
particular the 45th Infantry Division. Keith Bonn, in When the Odds were Even, was the only 
historian to write an in-depth review of the campaign. He concluded that the Germans were 
fighting to hold the mountains and that the American push through the Vosges proved the 
superiority of the American army. He overlooked that the Germans were fighting a delaying 
defense and that the odds were far from even. The study draws upon military documents from 
the 45th Infantry Division, units linked to the Division and documents from Army Group G. It 
also uses the Truppenführung (German Army Manuel) for information on the German delaying 
defense of World War II.  It also draws upon various secondary sources for the historiography 
and background for the study. Chapter one covers the historiography of the debate over the 
Broad Front versus the Narrow Front along with the historiography of the southern prong of the 
Broad Front. Chapter two introduces the two sides fighting in the Vosges, the tactic of a delaying 
iv 
 
defense and the history of the mountains. Chapter three covers the German delaying defense 
from the Moselle River to the foothills of the Low Vosges. Chapter four covers OPERATION 
NORDWIND, the German counterattack of January 1945, designed to push the Allies back into the 
mountains. The thesis promotes an understanding that Army Group G fought a delaying defense 
in the Vosges Mountains. It had four lines of resistance in the area, first at the Moselle River, 
then the high Vosges foothills, inside the mountains and then in the foothills of the low Vosges. 
In the Truppenführung, the Germans outlined the tactics for a delaying defense. They used 
pillboxes, dugouts, dummy fortifications, barbed wire, roadblocks, mines, and booby-traps. They 
refused to maintain contact with the Americans unless in a fortified town. They continued to fall 
back to new defensive lines. When the Allies threatened to cross the Rhine River, the Germans 
counterattacked in OPERATION NORDWIND. Army Group G received terrible reinforcements from 
all over Nazi occupied territory. Army Group G lacked the necessary supplies to fight the 
campaign and it suffered from poor communication between the units. The 45th Infantry 
Division had a far better logistical situation than the Germans had in the battle for the Vosges. 
The odds in the Vosges were against the Wehrmacht and their only hope was to fight a delaying 








Chapter 1: Historiography: The Southern Prong of the Board Front   
 
 In the European Theater of World War II, the struggle to liberate southern France is 
overshadowed by the fighting in the north. The Allies tasked the US Seventh Army with taking 
back southern France from the German Army Group G. After the Americans landed unopposed 
in OPERATION DRAGOON (15 August 1944), the Wehrmacht retreated to the Moselle River. The 
two sides fought across the Vosges Mountains into the Alsace Plains in the middle of winter. The 
Allies overcame the mountains along with the defenses of the Maginot and Siegfried lines. The 
Americans became the first army to successfully cross the Vosges while battling an enemy. 
Many historians argue that the Wehrmacht in 1944 was in decline and retreated towards 
Germany. Historian Keith Bonn claims that the Wehrmacht was the same fighting force from 
1939, and that Army Group G fought to hold the battle for the Vosges; however, he overlook the 
condition and logistical situation of Army Group G during the Vosges Campaign. He thought 
that this campaign could prove American superiority in the war. He also maintains that the 
infantry did all of the work during the campaign, while tanks and aircrafts had no effect on the 
battle.1 
The fighting in the Vosges Mountains has long been overlooked by historians. Directly 
after the war, several units produced histories of their operations during World War II. The 
157th, 179th, and 180th Infantry Regiments created yearbook style books for each of its soldiers 
to take home with them.  Leo Bishop, the 45th Infantry Division’s intelligence officer wrote a 
history of the division after it returned to the states. In the 1950s, the US Seventh Army created a 
                                                          
1Kieth E. Bonn, When the Odds were Even: The Vosges Mountains Campaign, October 1944- January 
1945 (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), 6-7, 44, 47, 62-4, 73-4 and 86-7.   
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history of its actions during the war. Most of the unit produced histories grazed over the fighting 
in the Vosges. The Seventh Army went into some detail about the campaign, but focused only on 
the American side.  
Between 1970 and 1990, historians wrote about the campaign in reference to the 45th 
Division’s trek through Europe with little to no new information, but between 1990 and 2010, 
scholars started to focus more on the fighting in the Vosges Mountains. In 1993, Jeffery Clarke 
wrote Rivera to the Rhine, in which he took an in depth look at the campaign, but focused mostly 
on the Allies. In the same year, Keith Bonn created his own in depth review of the battle for the 
mountains. He became the first historian to give some insight into the Wehrmacht’s situation and 
the tactics of both sides. Vosges Mountain Campaign has a limited historiography, but fits inside 
the historiography of the Broad Front versus Narrow Front.    
Army Group G fought a delaying defense against the US Seventh Army in the Vosges 
Mountains from the Moselle River to the Rhine River. The army group received poor 
reinforcements, few supplies and had less equipment than the 45th Infantry Division. The 
Americans’ push through the mountains was inevitable and the Germans could only hope to slow 
the allied advance. The author of this study uses military documents from the 45th Infantry 
Division and units linked to the Division. He reviewed the Truppenführung (German Army 
Manuel) for information on the German delaying defense of World War II.  He also uses military 
documents from Army Group G along with firsthand accounts of the fighting in the Vosges 
Mountains. The author reviewed the operational documents from the 36th Infantry Division. He 
looked at operational reports for each month, G-1 reports (personal), G-2 reports (intelligence), 
G-3 reports (operations), and G-4 reports (supply). The research endorses the theory that the 
Wehrmacht in the Vosges Mountains fought a delaying defense. It did not have the necessary 
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manpower, supplies or other means to keep the Americans from crossing the mountains.   
Further studies of the Vosges Mountain campaign require more in depth research of the fighting 
men from both sides. It requires more research into German military documents and it should 
focus on the other divisions of the US Seventh Army.       
       The thesis promotes an understanding that Army Group G fought a delaying defense in 
the Vosges Mountains. It had four lines of resistance in the area, first at the Moselle River, then 
the high Vosges foothills, inside the mountains and then in the foothills of the low Vosges. In the 
Truppenführung, the Germans outlined the tactics for a delaying defense. The Germans used 
pillboxes, dugouts, dummy fortifications, barbed wire, roadblocks, mines, and booby-traps. They 
refused to maintain contact with the Americans unless in a fortified town. They continued to fall 
back to new defensive lines. When the Allies threatened to cross the Rhine River, the Germans 
counterattacked in OPERATION NORDWIND with the hope of pushing the Americans back into the 
mountains. All of these are parts of the delaying defense as outlined in the Truppenführung.    
 Army Group G received terrible reinforcements from all over Nazi occupied territory. 
Foreign reinforcements came from Poland, Italy, Belarus, Czech Republic and Ukraine. Most of 
these troops thought they would be fighting the Russians and they surrendered upon contact with 
the Americans. In September and October, most reinforcements came from air force ground 
crews and from the navy. They also came from the marines and coastal defense forces.  Army 
Group G had to create units to defend its lines from stragglers of the retreat from southern 
France. In November and December, most replacements came from the Volksstrum, which were 
mostly elderly men, young men, convalescents and others that had been previously deemed unfit 
for military duty.  
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 Army Group G lacked the necessary supplies to fight the campaign and it suffered from 
poor communication between the units. Most German soldiers did not receive hot meals unless 
they happened to be defending a city. They lacked winter clothing and fresh water as many 
troops in the later period were captured while searching for something to drink. They received 
adequate ammunition supplies, but it reached the front at irregular intervals due to the lack of 
transportation. They received faulty ammunitions in the later period as many artillery shells in 
December were duds. The units of Army Group G had poor communication with each other. 
Most units could not identify the other units in its sector. Many went weeks without contact with 
headquarters or other units in the rear. German troops also became casualties while retreating, 
after they wandered into mine fields laid by other German units.      
 The 45th Infantry Division had a far better logistical situation than the Germans had in 
the battle for the Vosges. It received plenty of reinforcements and enough supplies to keep the 
advance moving forward. It also provided rest camps for its soldiers, which the Germans lacked 
during the campaign. Tanks and airplanes had a large role in the fight for the mountains. The 
infantry, on both sides, used armor for direct fire support. The Americans used tanks to 
overcome pillboxes and other fortifications. Both sides used aircraft to attack artillery positions 
in the rear. There were few good flying days during the period, but aircraft had a sustainable role 
in the campaign.   
The thesis proves that Army Group G could not stop the Allied advance through the 
Vosges. It did not receive the much needed reinforcements or the necessary supplies to prevent 
the Seventh Army from making it to the Rhine River. The 45th Infantry Division recognized that 
the Germans were fighting a delaying defense. The thesis also highlights the problems that the 
Wehrmacht faced in 1944. It shows that tanks and aircraft had a larger role in the fighting than 
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Bonn admitted in his book. It verifies that the campaign cannot be used to substantiate the claim 
of the American army’s superiority in the war, because the odds were anything but even.    
From October 1944 to January 1945, the 45th Infantry Division was part of the US 
Seventh Army’s struggle to push the German Army Group G out of the Vosges Mountains. (See 
Map 1) In the west, the Americans and British advanced in Eisenhower’s Broad Front, in which 
the Vosges Mountain Campaign was part of the southern prong. Several factors slowed the 
45th’s advance through the region; however, the primary factor was the Germans implemented a 
delaying defense to slow the American advance towards the Rhine River. In the east, the 
Russians moved in two prongs towards Berlin, the largest moving directly on the city through 
Poland and the other advancing through the Balkans. The Wehrmacht lost ground on both fronts 
attempted to slow down the Allies.  
 The debate over the Broad Front versus Single Thrust started with the generals involved 
in the debate. The scholars that followed can be broken down into these categories, Cold War, 
Logistics, Narrow Front, Political, and Coalition historians. Only a very few of the historians 
disputed each other directly. All of these scholars focused on the fighting in the north and the top 
four generals. The Cold War historians argued that the Broad Front led to the loss of Eastern 
Europe and the tensions between the two new superpowers. The Logistical historians contended 
that the Broad Front was the only possible strategy given the supply situation in 1944. The 
Narrow Front historians evolved their argument over time, with the common link that 
Montgomery’s personality kept the Single Thrust from becoming a reality. The Political 
historians maintained that each strategy developed in reflection of the political situation in each 
nation at the time. The Coalition historians developed their arguments from a combination of the 









                                                          
2 The Vosges Mountains are represented by the blue triangles.   
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exception of the histories of the 45th Infantry Division or historians writing about the other units 
of the Seventh Army involved in the campaign.  
Soon after the war, the three main generals in the debate over the strategies published 
their war memoirs, in an attempt to justify their decisions during the war.3 The Supreme Allied 
Commander Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower made the decision for the Allies to advance on 
Germany in two prongs from the north and south, which was the Broad Front Strategy. 
Commanders under Eisenhower, primarily Field Marshal Bernard “Monty” Montgomery, 
advocated the Single Thrust or Narrow Front Strategy. It called for a forty-division thrust 
towards Berlin. (See Map 2) In the years following the war, historians pondered over which 
strategy was better for the realities of the fighting in Europe. Those that support the Narrow 
Front think that the war could have ended in 1944 with a drive towards the capital of the Nazi 
empire. The historians that support the Broad Front argue that it was the only strategy logistically 
possible and Eisenhower could not allow an American or British general to win the war due to 
the politics of coalition warfare. Since the end of the Second World War, historians have debated 
whether General Eisenhower or Field Marshal Montgomery’s plan would have brought an end to 
the fighting in Europe faster. 
In January 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) 
had made plans for a dual invasion of France with one in the north and the other in the south to  
 
 
                                                          










open the second front.4 Eisenhower gave the plan his full support, while the British tried to 
persuade him against the landings in the south.5 The first landing was on 6 June 1944 in 
Normandy in Operation OVERLORD. On 15 August 1944, the Allies invaded southern France in 
Operation DRAGOON.6 By the end of August, the Allies in the north were nearing the Seine 
River. In the south, the American Seventh Army had quickly advanced on the retreating 
Germans and was nearing the Vosges Mountains. Many Americans and British thought the war 
could be over by Christmas of 1944.7 Soon after the Normandy landings, the generals debated 
what strategy could bring the quickest defeat to Germany. Montgomery argued that the 
Wehrmacht had collapsed and if he had forty divisions under his command that he could take 
Berlin before the end of 1944.8 During the advance the three major American generals in the 
theater would switch to a defensive role to keep the enemy busy.9 General Sir Alan Brooke 
(Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, each wanted to 
knock Germany out of the war as fast as possible and supported Montgomery.10  
The three major military commanders in the debate over the strategies defended their 
positions. Eisenhower in Crusade in Europe (1948) discussed Montgomery, Bradley and Patton, 
                                                          
4 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States 
Army, 1989), 108-9.   
5 Dwight Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, INC., 1948), 220-
4.  
6 Ibid., 250-1. The operation had originally been planned to happen on the same day as the Normandy 
landings, but had to be delayed due to the lack of landing crafts.   
7 Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field- Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (New York: 
The World Publishing Company, 1958), 240 and 244-5.  
8 Ibid., 244-6.   
9 Ibid., 241-6 and Eisenhower, 305-10. General George Patton and General Omar Bradley favored a single 
thrust into Germany, but under their leadership.  
10 Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944- 1945 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 576- 8.  
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who all wanted to lead a Single Thrust on Berlin, while the others went on the defensive.11 He 
contended that this was impossible because the logistical situation in Europe prevented such a 
plan.12 Montgomery published his memoirs in 1958 and contended that political pressure stopped 
Eisenhower from supporting his plan, because the American public and politicians in 
Washington could not accept American divisions command by a British Field Marshal.13 
Montgomery thought the war needed to end by Christmas in order to help British morale at 
home, which he feared was nearing its limits.14 Bradley in A Soldier’s Story (1951), argued that 
he had never supported a Single Thrust, because it would have never worked.15 Each general 
worked to protect their own wartime prestige.   
Directly after the war, historians who were part of the war started to debate the two 
strategies basing their decision on the Allied logistics of 1944. Alan Moorehead started the 
logistical argument in Montgomery (1946), in which he reviewed Montgomery’s role as a field 
marshal.16 He contended that the Single Thrust strategy would have failed because the Allies 
lacked deep-water ports to supply the armies.17 Francis De Guingand in Operation Victory 
(1946) gave his view on the operations in Europe. He argued that a severe lack of supplies could 
                                                          
11 Eisenhower, 305-10. Eisenhower maintained that the Allies needed to keep the German defenses spread 
out to keep them from building their forces for a counter attack. He would have the Allied Armies advance in a long 
line toward the Rhine River. His policy was to remain strong nowhere and to grind down the Germans before 
entering Germany. 
12 Ibid., 306. 
13 Montgomery, 241-2.  
14 Ibid., 241-4. He maintained that the narrow front would have worked if the supplies for OPERATION 
DRAGOON were sent to his army. Montgomery claimed that he had gained the support of General Bradley for his 
plan.  
15 Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 434-5. He was adamant 
that he had always supported Eisenhower’s plan from the day he introduced it.  
16 Alan Moorehead, Montgomery (New York: Coward- McCann, Inc., 1946), 204-5. In the chapter entitled 
“Great Argument,” he discusses the fighting between Montgomery and Eisenhower over strategy. Moorehead was a 
war correspondent with the British.  
17 Ibid., 204- 7. He contends that without the needed supplies, the thrust would possibly have been cut off; 
however, it was the best chance for ending the war before 1945. He claimed that had the war ended in 1944, it would 
have saved thousands of lives and saved Europe from the ensuing famine after the war 
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not support a single thrust toward Berlin and all Montgomery would have accomplished was a 
bridgehead on the Rhine River by the end of 1944.18  These two historians started the debate over 
logistics and future scholars built on their framework.   
From 1951 to 2013, several historians used logistics in analyzing which of the two 
strategies could have ended with war fastest. Ronald Ruppenthal in August 1951 wrote an article 
for the Military Review in which he reviewed the logistical necessities of both strategies and 
contended that both plans were impossible without the Allies seizing the German held river port 
at Antwerp.19 J.R.M Butler in a series of books reviewed the Western Allies’ war strategy in the 
book, Grand Strategy (1956), and studied both theaters of operation. In volume six of the series 
he discussed logistics of the Broad Front Strategy and argued that it was the only plan that could 
have worked with the Allies’ supply situation.20 Journalist Rick Atkinson wrote a three-volume 
history of World War II, the Liberation Trilogy in the third volume, The Guns at Last Light 
                                                          
18 Francis De Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), 410-4. De 
Guinngand was a staff officer in the Royal Army serving under Montgomery. The most likely outcome De 
Guingand maintained was, the British thrust would have been cut off and encircled. Therefore, he was in favor of 
the Broad Front Strategy since it was the best for the situation in Europe during 1944. 
19 Ronald G. Ruppenthal, “Logistic Limitations on Tactical Decisions,” Military Review XXXI No. 5 
(August 1951): 7-9. The arguments he made in the article, became the basis for chapter 18 in the book Command 
Decisions, which is part of the US Army’s official histories of World War II. Ruppenthal was an American military 
historian with Operations Research Office studying World War II. Ruppenthal argues that even though Montgomery 
had taken the port, the single thrust was impossible because the length of the supply lines to Berlin were beyond the 
limits of the Allies, and  would have been vulnerable to attack from the Germans, and they could have captured the 
entire forty divisions.     
20 J.R.M Butler etd. Grand Strategy Volume 6 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1956) 34-6. The 
book is part of the British Army official history of the war. Butler was a well-respected, traveling British military 
history professor and lecturer in the United Kingdom. He argued that Eisenhower’s plan was to grind down the 
German Army before entering Germany, so that the defenses would be sufficiently weakened. He claimed that while 
the Broad Front worked, it also left the Allied armies extremely vulnerable to an all-out attack. The supply lines 
were stretched thin and if the Germans attacked full force in all sectors the Allies would have to retreat towards the 
English Channel.     
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(2013) in which he reviews the western front of Europe in 1944-45, and argued that the Single 
Thrust was logistically impossible.21 
Montgomery had his supporters that looked to other factors that affected the war in 
Europe, such as the field marshal’s personality. Chester Wilmot in The Struggle for Europe 
(1956) in which he focused on the Western Allies fight against the Nazis in Europe, and argued 
that the Single Thrust was the best strategy for ending the war and the greatest counter for the 
way that the Germany Army fought the war.22 B. Liddell-Hart wrote, History of the Second 
World War (1971) which was his comprehensive study of the war in both theaters, and he argued 
that the Allies should have gone with the Narrow Front, because it offered the quickest hope of 
victory. 23 Russell Weigley in Eisenhower’s Lieutenants (1981) criticized the claims made by 
Liddell-Hart. He discussed the roles that Eisenhower’s top generals played in the liberation of 
Europe and argued that Eisenhower’s Broad Front Strategy was better, because that German 
Army had not yet collapsed. 24 Nigel Hamilton the famous Montgomery biographer contended 
that Eisenhower had preferred the Single Thrust in Monty (1981), and argued that Eisenhower 
                                                          
21 Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945 Volume III (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2013), 227-9. The advance could not be supported all the way to Berlin. The drive would 
have been enveloped and destroyed 
22 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London: The Reprint Society, 1956), 458- 62. Wilmot was an 
Australian war correspondent that spent World War II with the British Army. He argued that Eisenhower did not 
understand the tactical situation in Europe because he was not a ground commander. Wilmot maintained that 
Montgomery was a strategic genius and unappreciated by the Americans.    
23 B.H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1971), 561-3. 
Liddell-Hart is a well-respected British military historian. Eisenhower’s plan was only good for the planning table 
and not the realities of war.    
24 Weigley, 576-8. Weigley was a distinguished American Military Historian at Temple University. He 
maintained that the historians that make the case for the Single Thrust such as Liddell-Hart misjudged the actual 
strength of the Germans in the fall of 1944.   The book is a biography of Montgomery. Chalfont does spend most of 
the book on the Second World War. Chalfont wants to portray the story of Montgomery the man, and not the 
military commander.  
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had never wanted to attack on a Broad Front. The problem was that he could not decide between 
Montgomery, Bradley or Patton to lead the advance, so he settled on the Broad Front Strategy.25  
In the last half of the twentieth century, historians used the politics of coalition warfare to 
debate the two strategies. Stephen Ambrose began the politics debate in The Supreme 
Commander (1970) he argued that the Allied generals had their own nation’s political bosses to 
appease, and Eisenhower had the task of making the politicians of both countries happy. The 
Broad Front Strategy was the only plan that could satisfy political leaders of both nations.26 
Charles Whiting picked up were Ambrose left off in The Field Marshal’s Revenge (2004) he 
argues that the special relationship between America and England was strained during the war. 
He maintained that the two generals were pawns in their nation’s game during the war, and the 
two strategies became a matter of national pride.27   
The debate over Eisenhower and Montgomery pleasing their political bosses transformed 
into the issue of running an effective coalition war. Carlo D’Este in Decision in Normandy 
(1983) argued that Eisenhower’s plan made the most logistical sense, and it was based on the 
                                                          
25 Nigel Hamilton, The Battles of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1981), 
414- 15, 563, 565. Monty is the condensed version of the three-volume set of Montgomery’s war years. Hamilton 
quickly goes over field marshal’s life before the war and then the bulk of the book is about his decisions during the 
war.    
26Stephen Ambrose, The Supreme Commander (Garden City, NY: Dobuleday & Co., 1970), 412-24. 
Ambrose is an American military historian, admirer of General Eisenhower and wrote many other books about the 
general. The book is about Dwight Eisenhower’s role as a general and then supreme commander in the Second 
World War. He explored the general’s relationships with the other commanders and political leaders from both 
Western Allied nations.    
27 Charles Whiting, The Field Marshal’s Revenge: The Breakdown of a Special Relationship (Emeryville, 
CA: Spellmount, 2004.), 137-45.If the Eisenhower had allowed the Single Thrust Strategy to go ahead, then the best 
chance it had of being effect was in 1944. After that there was no chance for success. Whiting in a British historian 
and fiction writer, contended that the strain was mirrored in the relationship between Montgomery and Eisenhower.   
He argued that Montgomery advocated his strategy for national pride, because he would be in charge not 
Eisenhower and the American generals would be regulated to a holding position while the British took Berlin.  
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politics of coalition warfare. He contended that politics created the Broad Front because all 
Allied armies in the west had to enter Germany at the same time.28  
The southern prong of the Broad Front Strategy along with the campaigns involved has 
been widely ignored by historians. Those who acknowledged the fighting in southern France 
mostly blamed the advance for taking valuable resources from the fighting in the north. 
OPERATION DRAGOON, the landing in the southern France, started the second prong of the Broad 
Front. Despite protests from the British, Eisenhower insisted on the operation. The southern 
prong of the strategy was attended to keep the Germans from attacking the allies in the north 
from southern France.29 The allied forces involved in southern France were the US Seventh 
Army and the First French Army under General Alexander Patch. In reality, Patch had three 
corps available to him, which were the US VI Corps and the French I and II Corps.30 The most 
important campaign of the southern sector was the Vosges Mountain Campaign. The Vosges was 
the final buffer between the Allied forces and the Rhine River. All the histories that reviewed the 
southern prong mention but a few analyze the Vosges Campaign.  
After the war, the armies and regiments of the US Army wrote the history of their actions 
during World War II. The Seventh Army produced Report of Operations: The Seventh United 
States Army in France and Germany 1944- 1945 in 1946 and reproduced it in 1988.31 They used 
after action reports from every unit of the Seventh Army to create the narrative. It gives a day-
                                                          
28 Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy (New York: E.P. Dutton, INC., 1983), 309, 464, 466, and 468- 70. 
D’Este is a retired Army officer and a military historian with his degree from the University of Richmond. He 
discussed the planning for the Normandy invasion and the strategy taken after the war, particularly the role that 
Montgomery had during this time. He maintained that Eisenhower could not allow an American or British 
commander to take Berlin without upsetting the other side.    
29Atkinson, 192-4.  
30 Ibid., 188-90.   
31 It was originally printed in a three volume set and the reprint is in two volumes.   
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by-day account of the corps and divisions that made up the army. For the planning and battles, 
the accounts go down to the battalion and regimental level; however, for major engagements it 
reviews company operations. It only gives details of what happened and no analysis of the 
events. Directly after the war, the three infantry regiments (157th, 179th, and 180th) of the 45th 
Infantry Division produced their operational histories for members of the regiment. The 180th 
Infantry Regiment produced its history while still in Munich, Germany in 1945. It reviews the 
engagements and movements of the regiment during the war. There are two chapters about the 
180th in southern France.32 The 157th Infantry Regiment produced its history in 1946 while in 
the United States. The 179th Infantry Regiment created its history while in the United States in 
1946. Both histories include three chapters on its operations in France. All three reviews the 
engagements and movements of the regiments, and were produced from the units’ after action 
reports. In 1946, Leo Bishop wrote The Fighting Forty Fifth: The Combat Report of an Infantry 
Division.33 Bishop was a Lieutenant Colonel and Intelligence Officer for the division during 
World War II. He gave a day-by-day account of the regiments in the division. He wrote it in a 
report style from the G-2 and after action reports from the 45th Infantry Division. He has a 
chapter on the operations in southern France and one on the Vosges campaign. In the four 
histories, they reviewed the events of the French campaign without analyzing them. 
Interest in the southern prong faded away until the 1970s and 80s. John Turner and 
Robert Jackson wrote Destination Berchtesgaden in 1975. Turner and Jackson are both British 
military historians. The book concerning the Seventh Army’s operations during the war from 
Sicily to Germany, and covers the major engagements that involved Seventh Army, but offers 
                                                          
32 A problem with using the book is that it lacks page numbers.   
33 Leo V. Bishop, The Fighting Forty Fifth: The Combat Report of an Infantry Division (Baton Rouge: 
Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946).    
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nothing new from the unit histories, nor any analyses of the operations. They review southern 
France and the Vosges campaign with few details.34 In 1984, Kenny Franks wrote Citizen 
Soldiers a history of the Oklahoma National Guard. Franks is an Oklahoma historian that has 
wrote on several topics in Oklahoma history.35 Citizen Soldiers is a detailed history of the 
Oklahoma National Guard from the formation of the territorial militia to the Cold War. Most of 
the book is spent on the 45th Infantry Division during World War II. He only writes about the 
major battles that the National Guard was involved in. These three academics offered nothing 
new from the writings of the unit histories.  
The official US Army histories of the fighting in southern France and the Vosges came 
out nearly 50 years after the war ended. Jeffrey Clarke in 1993 wrote Riviera to the Rhine, which 
was the first official history to cover the operations of the second prong. In 1990, Clarke became 
the Chief Historian of the Center of Military History. He reviewed the operations of the US 
armies from OPERATION DRAGOON to the crossing of the Rhine River. He argued that the Seventh 
Army was able to move quickly through the south, because German defenses were weak in the 
area. The German positions were indefensible and they were retreating towards the Rhine.36 He 
contended that the American advance slowed only after they entered the Vosges. The advance 
was slowed only by lack of airfields, weather and terrain but, the most important was logistical 
problems.37 The Germans were able to hold off the Allies, because their supply lines were 
shortened and they were receiving well-trained reinforcements.38 In 2012, Clarke revisited the 
southern prong in Southern France published by the Center for Military History. He did not offer 
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anything new to the campaign. He argued that, “the Southern France Campaign showed what 
experienced, well-led Allied troops could do against their German foes.”39 He contended that 
there has been very little written on efforts of the allies in the south and it “deserves more study 
and attention than it has yet received.”40 
In the last part of the 1990s, two academics wrote about the southern flank of the Broad 
Front. Flint Whitlock wrote The Rock of Anzio in 1998 in which he reviewed the operations of 
the 45th Infantry Division from Sicily to Munich. Whitlock is a Vietnam veteran and amateur 
historian. He discusses the major engagements that the division was involved in down to the 
company level. He details of actions of the division but offers no analyses. Charles Whiting 
wrote America’s Forgotten Army in 1999 and reviewed the operations of the Seventh Army 
during World War II. Whiting is a British military historian who has written on several military 
topics. In the book, he discusses the operations of the Seventh Army during the war. The book is 
very similar to Destination Berchtesgaden. The only difference is that he argues the Americans 
decided to advance through the Vosges at the urging of the French military.41 The two academics 
offered very little new information to the southern flank of the Broad Front. 
In 2013, two academics produced books on the subject. Alex Kershaw wrote The 
Liberator in which he followed Colonel Felix Sparks, 500 day odyssey with the 45th Infantry 
Division’s 157th Infantry Regiment during the war. His book is a popular history and is more 
entertainment than a research resource due to the poorly cited sources.42 He hints that his book 
contains new evidence of the division’s actions during the war, but all the information is located 
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in other secondary sources. He offers nothing new to the debate of southern France or the 
Vosges. Rick Atkinson in Guns at Last Light wrote about both the north and southern flank of 
the Broad Front strategy. He also added new information on the Vosges campaign. He argued 
that the southern prong was needed because a two “punch” approach had won every campaign 
for Montgomery.43 “Two-fisted punching had in fact won through for Montgomery at Alamein, 
Mareth, and Normandy.”44 He contends that the Germans did not want to fight in the Vosges, as 
their main defensive position was outside the mountains near the city of Colmar west of the 
Rhine River. The German plan for fighting the Americans was to slow their advance to the river. 
He maintains that the VI Corps did not want to fight in the Vosges either. General Lucian 
Truscott was disappointed when he was ordered into the mountains as he had hoped to by-pass 
them and link up with Patton’s army.45 Since the end of the Second World War, there has only 
been one in-depth study of the battle for the Vosges.  
Keith Bonn did the first and only study of the Vosges Mountain Campaign, inspired by 
US Army Colonel Karl Detzer work, The Mightiest Army (1945). His work was an overview of 
America’s involvement in the Second World War and argued that the U.S. Army was the best 
military force to ever take the battlefield in the history of warfare.46 In When the Odds were Even 
(1994), Bonn attempted to prove that the US Army was better than the Wehrmacht. He analyzed 
the Vosges Campaign from October 1944 to January 1945, because he thought that the odds 
were even in supplies, air coverage, and terrain. Bonn argued that the American soldiers had 
superior training and reinforcements. He maintained that the Vosges Mountains were an 
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impenetrable fortress and since the Americans were able to fight their way through the 
mountains, they were the better army.47 
Bonn wrote to refute the work of Retired US Army Colonel Trevor Dupuy and Martin 
Van Creveld, because he thought they favored the German Army in their works. Dupuy wrote 
Numbers, Predictions and War (1979) in which he created a formula to analyze past and future 
military engagements. He used morale, supplies, equipment, manpower and other factors to 
determine the combat effectiveness of each side and should have won the battle.48 He concluded 
that the Wehrmacht was the most effective army in the Second World War.49 Van Creveld 
continued the work of Dupuy in Fighting Power (1982), he reviewed the performance of the 
German and US Armies in the Second World War. Van Creveld analyzed, developed, and 
adapted their fighting style based on economic and technological factors. He also looked at 
training, manpower and logistics. He made the argument that the Germans had developed the 
superior fighting power, based on the number of military victories that they achieved while 
outnumbered and fighting with old equipment.50 
The official histories of the campaign ignore the intent of the Germans and only discuss 
the amazing victory of the Americans fighting their way through a well-fortified position, rather 
than that the Germans were fighting a delaying defense to slow the American advance to the 
Rhine River. This thesis will add to the work started by Bonn. He made several assumptions in 
his book that were wrong and need corrected. Bonn failed to realize that the Germans were 
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performing a delaying defense and not fighting to hold on to the Vosges Mountains. He was too 
focused on trying to prove that the American Army’s superiority to the Germans, that he 
overlooked key facts to get to his conclusion. This thesis will correct the problems made in When 

















 Chapter 2: The Vosges Mountains, Germans and 45th Infantry Division in 1944 
 
When the Odds were Even is a flawed, but important introduction research of the Vosges 
Campaign, since Bonn’s thesis is disproved with a study of the campaign. He failed to realize 
that the Germans were fighting a delaying defense in the mountains, because it had the ideal 
terrain for the tactic. He set out to prove that the American Army of 1944 was better than the 
German Army at any time during the Second World War.
1 The truth is by the fall of 1944 their fighting with the Allies had weakened them to the 
point that they were on the defensive. The German Army slowly retreated towards Germany on 
all three fronts (Italy, France and in the east). In the summer of the same year, the Russian 
offensive destroyed twenty- five German divisions, and the Wehrmacht anticipated 1.6 million 
casualties by October.2  In his work, he inflates the quality and strength of the enemy facing the 
US VI Corps. This study seeks to correct the problems with the first extensive study of the 
Vosges Mountain Campaign from the 45th Infantry Division’s records. 
In August 1944, the US Seventh Army commanded by General Alexander Patch, landed 
in southern France in OPERATION DRAGOON.3 After which they raced over 400 miles in one 
month chasing after the retreating German Army Group G.4  The 45th Division, is one of three 
divisions that made up the VI Corps. By October 1944, the Allies faced the Vosges Mountains, 
one of the last obstacles between them and the Rhine River.5 General Lucian Truscott 
commander of the VI Corps, protested the order to move his corps through the mountains, 
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because of the rough terrain and easily defensible location.6 Instead of making a stand to hold the 
mountains at all cost, the Germans chose a different tactic, a delaying defense to slow the 
American advance to the Rhine River. This is part of the German Doctrine in the 
Truppenführung (German Army Manual for Unit Command in World War II) that outlines where 
and how to perform a delaying defense. The reports from the 45th Infantry Divisions 
demonstrate that the Nineteenth Army fought a delaying defense in the mountains. The 
combination of the manual and reports indicate that the Germans only sought to slow the 
Americans and not keep possession of the mountains. The US Seventh Army was the first 
military forces to successfully make it through the Vosges, but its advance was inevitable. The 
Germans had used a delaying defense in the East, in the hopes of slowing the Soviet juggernaut. 
By the time of the Vosges Campaign, the German Army was in poor shape and got worse with 
each passing month. Before a study of the campaign can be started, one must understand the 
terrain of the Vosges, doctrine of a delaying defense, strength of the combatants, and strategy of 
the German Army in 1944. 
The Vosges are a rugged mountain range in eastern France’s Alsace region, along the 
German border, and have been a defensive citadel since Julius Caesar marched on Gaul.7 They 
are known as the Hardt Mountains to the Germans and have been the historical disputed border 
between France and Germany.8 The Vosges is bordered by Alsace on the western edge and the 
Rhine River on the east. Only 15 miles separate the two landmarks. The mountains run parallel 
to the Rhine on the Alsatian Plain for roughly 90 miles, and are 25 miles wide at their widest 
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point.9 The Vosges rise from the Rhine Valley, starting near Belfort, to heights of over 4500 feet. 
The mountains are broken up into two distinct sections, the Low and the High Vosges, by the 
Saverne Gap. 10 They are also known as the Sandstone and Granite Vosges, respectively.11  
The High Vosges rise to heights of over 4600 feet and are tilted to the east. The tallest of 
the peaks is Mount Grand Ballon at 4663 feet.12 (See Map 3) They are made of harder rock than 
the Low, such as gneiss, but mainly granite. The High is less steep than the Low; most of its 
slopes are gradual with long stretches of the flat ridge lines that allow for easy mobility on foot. 
The ridge lines above 2000 feet also extend into high mountain pastures and small plateaus. The 
High Vosges is densely forested, roughly 60% covered in forests.  These forests are made up 
mainly of tall pine trees with little underbrush and several footpaths, making it easy for soldiers 
to infiltrate the area while being protected from aerial bombardment; however, “Orientation by 
compass is vital throughout the Vosges, where paths winding through wooded areas cause even 
people who know the sector to lose their way.”13  The High Vosges also have several valleys 
where many of the major roads run through the area. The bottoms of the valleys are usually 
marshes that at first glance seem to be sturdy, but will not support the weight of vehicles, 
confining truck and tank traffic to the road network running through the valleys. The High 
Vosges support a larger network of roads than the Low, but most of them could only be used as 
single lane roads for military traffic.14 
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The largest obstacle, besides the mountains in the High, is the Meurthe River, which averages 50 
to 100 feet across and three to six feet deep.15 The division found area around the river suitable 
for the construction of military bridges as most of the bridges in the Vosges could not to be 
trusted due to their shoddy craftsmanship.16 Even though the High Vosges sits at a higher 
elevation than the Low, it still supports a large population, because it is more hospitable.17 
The Low Vosges rise to heights of only 1500 feet and drop off sharply. Like the High 
Vosges, they too are tilted towards the east. They are made up of sedimentary rocks such as 
limestone and sandstone.18 The sandstone belt that makes up the Low wraps around the western 
edge of the High.19 Even though they are smaller than the High Vosges, the ridges of the Low are 
extremely steep and make crossing nearly impossible. The slopes are between 15 and 30 degrees, 
making mechanized movement impossible outside the few roads that run through the area. Also, 
fewer roads and passes are found here than in the High, making navigation more difficult. The 
area’s high ground commands the roadways, making it easy for the enemy to attack. Trucks and 
tanks could not leave the road for the risk of becoming bogged down. The Low has fewer trees 
than the High, and more open fields that allow defenders a greater field of fire. In the High 
Vosges trees grow everywhere, from the ridges to the valleys, and in the Low, the trees grow 
only on the summits. The small valley floors are made up of meadows and are mainly used as 
pastures for livestock.20     
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The Vosges have historically been a bastion for defenders. The Celts used the mountains 
as protection from the Romans.21 The Germans settled the east side of the Vosges and the Celts 
lived on the opposite side. The Alsatians used the mountains as protection from the Huns.22 
Throughout the centuries, no army attempted to cross the Vosges.23 From the tenth through the 
eighteenth century, numerous leaders built fortresses in the passes of the Vosges to control the 
easy movement from east to west.24 From 1870 to 1943, the Vosges were a barrier used to keep 
modern armies out. During the Franco-Prussian War, the French placed soldiers in the mountains 
to defend France.  After the German victory in 1871, they took over Alsace and Lorraine, which 
became the Reichsland.25 During World War I, the German army in 1914 attempted to march 
through the Saverne Gap to attack Epinal and take it from the French. They stopped at the 
Meurthe River and the fighting became static like the rest of the fighting on the western front.26 
In 1940, the Germans followed the 1870 war plan and bypassed the Vosges, only moving into 
the mountains after they had taken control of France. The US Seventh Army in 1944, became the 
only army after World War I that attempted to march through the Vosges.  
The Germans hampered, but did not stop the Americans trek through the mountains due 
to a delaying defense. Truppenführung outlines the tactic in detail. This is the same tactic they 
used on the eastern and western (in the north) front. The German Army slowly retreated towards 
its homeland sapping enemy strength until their chance to strike a major blow to the enemy in 
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the hopes of regaining the terrain later.27 They did this on the Eastern front and counterattacked 
at Kursk. In the north on the Western front, they fought a delaying defense until they stuck the 
Allies at the Battle of the Bulge. The Wehrmacht did the same thing in the Vosges Mountains. 
They fought a delaying defense until they struck back at the Americans during OPERATION 
NORDWIND attempting to push the Americans back into the mountains.  
According to Truppenführung a delaying defense is used when the Germans are faced 
with a superior enemy force. The purpose is to sap the enemy strength while buying time to gain 
the advantage and go on the offensive once more. The strategy only works when the enemy force 
follows the defenders into a pre-prepared location, such as the Vosges Mountains. The main 
action takes place on a line of resistance by the infantry with several fallback positions. The 
terrain should be used to full advantage in determining the location of the line and the fallback 
positions. The best defensible area is mountains and wooded areas. Locations that force a narrow 
column of approach is preferred, such as the road system in the Vosges. The lines should also 
force the enemy to deploy early, thereby sapping time and resources. The commander decides 
the force used by his soldiers and the time for when they can retreat to the fallback positions. 
Subordinate commanders have the power to order a withdrawal before time if they are unable to 
defend their position. The defenders can put up a strong defense or can stay out of close contact 
with the enemy depending on the ability to defend that location. The lines are further 
strengthened by the use of obstacles in front of them. The obstacles slow down the enemy and 
allow the defenders the chance to counter attack. Obstacles can come in all types, with the 
exception of field fortifications, and dummy field fortifications are extremely valuable. The most 
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common obstacles used in the Vosges were barbed wire, road blocks, mines and dummy field 
fortifications. The German commander needs to break up the area into different sectors of the 
defense. In each sector, the commander should have pre-prepared lines of resistance.28   
The Truppenführung details how the German Army should conduct the delaying defense. 
Every unit is given a different mission and objective during the defense. The infantry are the 
backbone of the strategy. Their job is to harass and delay the enemy at every chance while 
keeping their distance. They engage the enemy in front of the line of resistance and fall back 
when the enemy offers a stiff defense.  Infantry with heavy weapons are placed in fortified 
positions in front of the line.29 “In covered terrain, light machine guns and riflemen can delay the 
enemy’s approach and deceive him as to the type of the defense and the location of the line of 
resistance.”30 They are also placed in front of the line to probe and harass the enemy, especially 
as they try to get past obstacles. The infantry is to make every attempt to hold to keep the enemy 
away from the line, so that they can retreat at night in the cover of darkness.31 “If the line of 
resistance is evacuated during the day the infantry heavy weapons and the artillery must deploy 
in depth.”32 If the enemy attempts to penetrate the line of infantry, they should be allowed to do 
so. The affected section should retreat with its flanks attacking the rapidly advancing enemy in 
the attempt to envelop them.33  
Artillery is important in assisting the infantry. It should be used to harass the movement 
of the enemy infantry. Forward observers for the artillery are mixed in with the infantry to help 
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coordinate the two elements.34 The commander of each battery has the power of “execution and 
control of the interdiction and harassing missions.”35 If adequate ammunition is available “every 
attempt must be made to deceive the enemy through aggressive artillery fire from widely 
dispersed positions.”36 Artillery and heavy weapon infantry are to maintain the line of resistance. 
They are to retreat to the next line before the infantry and provide covering fire for them. The 
sector commander has to give the order to retreat as soon as possible.37 “As the withdrawing 
units approach the new line of resistance, some of the artillery and infantry heavy weapons must 
be in position there already. Rifle companies are employed to the full effectiveness of their 
defensive capabilities as security elements in the line of resistance.”38  
Other unit types are held in the rear until the commander needs them. Armored vehicles 
are used to protect the retreating units by attacking the enemy. They also counter attack when the 
enemy penetrates the line.39 Engineers are deployed ahead of time to prepare lines of resistance 
and field fortifications. They also set up obstacles, construct roadblocks and lay landmines 
between the lines.40 Anti-tank units are used to protect open terrain and avenues of approach 
from enemy vehicles. When needed they are moved in front of the line to slow the enemy and 
are protected by the infantry. Smoke and chemical agents are extremely valuable in delaying the 
enemy. Smoke is used to deceive the enemy and provide cover for unit movement.41 “Terrain 
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contamination with chemical agents can restrict the enemy’s follow-up.”42 These units work in 
conjunction with the infantry and artillery to slow the enemy advance.    
The American army had a similar tactic to the delaying defense, “delaying action” is the 
American version. The 1944 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operation outlines the 
tactic.43 The field manual gives less instructions on the tactic than the Truppenführung. The 
purpose of the action is “to gain time while avoiding decisive action.”44 It is designed to buy time 
until they are prepared to battle, while the Germans use the time to sap the enemy’s strength. The 
Americans want to fight on the high ground with open terrain in front of them for “good 
observation and good fields of fire at long range.”45 They prefer to fight the enemy at long range 
where the infantry does not have to come into close contact with their adversary.46 In the 
delaying defense the Germans are willing to give up land, but for the Americans, “no more 
ground than necessary is given up.”47 The US Army also makes full use of fortified outposts with 
heavy machine guns deployed in front of the main lines of defense.48 Both tactics serve the same 
purpose, to delay the enemy for an offensive strike; however, the Americans attempt to hold as 
much ground as possible. By 1944, the Germans used the delaying defense on the western and 
eastern fronts.               
By 1943, the Wehrmacht had lost the offensive capabilities that it once had in 1939. The 
Allies had started gaining ground against the Axis powers in Europe. The Soviets, by the 
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summer of 1943, had taken back half of the Ukraine and Belarus. The Germans attempted to 
defend the east wall against the Russians. In OPERATION CITADEL, they sought to resume the 
offensive in Ukraine with a massive counterattack that failed.49 The western Allies defeated the 
Germans in Italy and Sicily. The Axis powers Forced on the defensive in Italy the Axis powers 
had lost much of the country to the Allies. The Germans in France prepared for the Anglo-
American invasion in the west.50 In the east, Hitler refused to give the initiative to the Russian 
Army.51 (See Map 4)  
 After the defeat, the Germans continued to fight a delaying defense in the east, because 
they lacked the offensive capabilities. The Germans prepared defensive lines from the Balkans to 
the Baltic Sea in preparations for the Russian counterattack; however, the Soviets turned their 
attention to the Finns. For the rest of 1943, the Russians fought to liberate Leningrad.52 In 
January 1944, the Red Army began a new offensive against the Germans.53 They attempted to 
hold the Soviets back at their preplanned defensive lines and slow their advance on Germany. 
They intended to go on the offensive again after forcing the western Allies out of the war. Their 
plan helped to slow the Red Army, but they could never retake the initiative.54 They used the 
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In 1943, the Germans assisted the Italians in defense of the Italian peninsula. The British 
and Americans invaded Italy on 3 September 1943, in OPERATION AVALANCHE. The Axis powers 
went on the defensive and counterattacked the Allies several times until the winter of 1943. Both 
combatants took up defensive lines and could not go on the offensive until the next year.55 On 22 
January 1944, the Allies performed OPERATION SHINGLE, an amphibious landing near the city of 
Anzio in order to break the stalemate. The landing placed them to the rear of the Axis defensive 
line.  The Germans held their defensive lines until May 1944, and they began to retreat towards 
Rome.56 On 5 June 1944, the Wehrmacht retreated from the city and into northern Italy. The 
Americans entered the city on that same day.57 After June 1944, the Germans lacked offensive 
capabilities on the Italian front. They setup a series of defensive lines throughout northern Italy 
and into the Alps. Italy gave the 45th Division, its first experience with the delaying defense.58            
In 1943, the Germans in France prepared for the inevitable invasion by the western 
Allies. They could not stop the preparations for the invasion, but only build up their coastal 
defenses. On 6 June 1944, the Anglo-Americans came ashore in OPERATION OVERLORD and 
started pushing into mainland France.59 By July, “The Wehrmacht was in headlong retreat from 
France, and the immediate tasks were to reconstitute German forces in the west and hold back 
the Allied forces while defenses in depth were strengthened along the Westwall.”60 The Germans 
retreated from Belgium into Holland. Hitler setup a series of defensive lines stretching from 
Holland through Germany down to Switzerland. On all three fronts, the Germans had taken up 
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defensive positions waiting for their chance to make an offensive strike. (See Map 5)  “Hitler’s 
strategy called for holding firm on all fronts until offensive preparations were complete. He 
believed that the British and Americans would be forced to halt after outrunning their 
supplies.”61 They thought that striking the western Allies would put them out of war and then 
they would only have to deal with the Russians.62 The delaying defense strategy that the 
Germans took in the Vosges Mountains happened to be the same strategy they took in northern 
France, Italy, and in the east.   
In southern France, the Germans lacked the men to defend the territory and their 
compatriots had retreated in northern France. On 18 August 1944, three days after the American 
invasion in OPERATION DRAGOON, Army Group G received orders to retreat from the area. The 
orders required all German soldiers and personnel attached to the Wehrmacht to move 
immediately towards Dijon with defensive withdrawal lines setup at major cities (Avignon, 
Grenoble, and Lyon) along the way.63 The divisions in Marseilles and Toulon had to protect U-
boat construction until pressured by the enemy and then they could start their retreat. LXII 
Reserve Infantry Corps and 148 Reserve Infantry Division had to break from the Nineteenth 
Army and move to the Italian border to protect the passes into Italy.64 The Nineteenth Army 
fought a delaying defense against the Americans to give the rest of the formations time to make 
their retreat towards Dijon.65 They fought during the day and withdrew to their new  
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defensive lines at night.66 (See Map 6) They made it to Lyon on 3 September 1944, and most of 
the German forces in southern France had arrived in Dijon.67 The Army Group G then retreated 
across the Moselle River while the Nineteenth Army set up a defense line near the city of Epinal. 
By 21 September 1944, all German forces had crossed the river ahead of the Americans.68 The 
bulk of Army Group G retreated into the Vosges Mountains with the Nineteenth Army as the 
rear guard. The Germans fought a delaying defense through the Vosges and west of the Rhine 
River with the plan of keeping the Seventh Army occupied until the spring of 1945.                
The 45th Infantry Division spent 511 days in combat during World War II. The division 
was a National Guard unit formed on 19 October 1920. It was made up of troops from Arizona, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.69 During the war, it joined the VI Corps of the Seventh 
Army. In May 1943, they departed for Oran in North Africa to await deployment into the 
European theater.70 The division first saw combat during OPERATION HUSKY on 10 June 1943, 
the Allied invasion of Sicily.71 Afterwards, it became a lead elements in the invasion of Italy. 
After the Allies became bogged down in Italy, the “Thunderbirds” were pulled off the front lines 
to make another amphibious landing into Italy.72 It had a pivotal role in the battle for Anzio. 
After it helped to defeat the Germans at Anzio, it fought its way towards Rome.73 Before it 
reached the city, the division pulled back for training in preparation of OPERATION DRAGOON.74  
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German Army Group G defended of Southern France during the operation. The 45th Infantry 
Division pursued Army Group G across Southern France and through the Vosges Mountains.75 
The Thunderbirds crossed the Rhine River on 26 March 1945 entering the Germany heartland.76 
On 29 April 1945, the “Thunderbirds” liberated the Dachau concentration camp.77 The division 
continued fighting Army Group G across Germany to the city Munich, where the war ended for 
both units.78        
During the war, the US Army infantry divisions formed a “Triangular” organization and 
consisted of nearly 15,000 troops. Each division had three infantry regiments of three battalions 
each.79 It had four artillery battalions to support the infantry.80 It also had support units 
consisting of a headquarters company, reconnaissance troop, military police platoon, signal 
company, ordnance company, engineer battalion, medical battalion and quartermaster 
company.81 The army attached tank and tank destroyer units to the division.82     
On 8 May 1944, the Wehrmacht created Army Group G for the protection of southern 
France in anticipation of an allied invasion of France.83 The First Army, Nineteenth Army and 
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LXXV Corps combined to make up the army group.84 Veterans of the Eastern front made up the 
divisions of Army Group G; however, they had nearly been destroyed in their fighting with the 
Russians. In order to bring the divisions back to fighting level, reservist, rear echelon, Luftwaffe 
ground crew members, stragglers, marines, and militiamen filled the ranks of the divisions.85 
Most of the soldiers of army group had their first combat experience as infantrymen, in southern 
France, against the US Seventh Army.  
 General Johannes Blaskowitz commanded Army Group G from 8 May to 21 September 
1944. The German high command blamed Blaskowitz for the botched retreat from southern 
France and they dismissed him of his command. The Seventh Army forced the Nineteenth Army 
to retreat sooner than they planned by outflanking, and this left some units behind the 
Americans.86 In September, General Hermann Black took command until 24 December 1944, 
and General Blaskowitz was placed back in charge.87 Both generals were veterans of World War 
I and career soldiers. Blaskowitz commanded soldiers in the 1939 invasion of Poland until he 
protested the abuses committed by SS soldiers. As a result, he lost his combat command and was 
forced into the military government of occupied France until taking control of Army Group G.88 
General Black commanded soldiers in Poland, France, Greece and the Eastern front before 
taking over the army group.89 Both generals were skilled officers and committed to the 
Wehrmacht.           
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The German Army, in 1944, lost the strength that it had at the beginning of the war. They 
also no longer had sufficient manpower to garrison their European conquests.90 The Germans did 
several things in order to make up the losses of their soldiers on the eastern front. The Germans 
reduced the size of their divisions and left decimated units as combat divisions. When the 
Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union, it had 153 divisions made up of 3.2 million soldiers. In 
November 1943, they had 195 divisions in the east made up of 2.85 million soldiers. They did 
this by removing four regiments from each infantry division. 91 They also left weakened units in 
combat. One such example from Army Group G is the German 48th Infantry Division that was 
withdrawn from the line in December 1944. “Its [sic] reported strength at that time was 850 
infantry and 47 artillerymen.”92     
The Wehrmacht also created the Volksgrenadier divisions to replace the infantry division. 
These divisions were used to fill in holes on the western and eastern fronts. They were “fairly 
low grade units.”93 “These divisions were formed at a stage of the war when both manpower and 
material was becoming scarce and it is unlikely that many were formed at full strength; 
nonetheless some 50 in all were formed or rebuilt from other formations before the war ended.”94 
The division had three infantry regiments with two battalions per regiment. The regiments had 
more automatic weapons to make up for the lack of men.95 It had four battalions of artillery, but 
the number of guns was reduced by 30 percent from the number of guns allowed at the start of 
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the war.96 The infantry is also supported by a headquarters company, antitank battalion, signal 
battalion and a fusilier company (reconnaissance company). The fusilier company had 200 men 
with bicycles that replaced the previous 625 men with motorized equipment. Horse-drawn 
transports replaced the motorized transports for moving supplies. The Germans also replaced 
heavy antitank weapons with panzerfausts.97 Remnants of destroyed line units and rear echelon 
troops made up the divisions. These men had little to no training before placement into combat.98 
The Volksgrenadier were weak combat units, but they did boost the number of men on the 
frontlines. The alterations did not help to change the problems the army faced in 1944.   
When Black took over the army group, he had a personal meeting with Adolf Hitler. 
Hitler told him that his command would not receive reinforcements, because of a planned 
offensive in France. He would lead the Americans into the “muddy ground and fog” and stiffen 
the defense.99 He needed to hold Alsace until after the November defensive and then 
reinforcements would be sent to the army.100 Army Group G from September to October 1944 
received no reinforcements because all strategic reserves moved north for the Ardennes 
offensive. In November, the Wehrmacht sent Volksstrum, the “last-ditch home guard” that came 
from the young and old as replacements to the army group. The Volksstrum came from the 
people last recruited for the war effort. 101 In November, they had to “transfer the 3rd and 15th 
motorised [sic] divisions” to the new offensive that help to weaken their combat strength.102 The 
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transfer of troops and the lack of proper reinforcements weakened the army group until 
December 1944.   
In 1944, the Americans had a better system of replacement in place than the Germans. 
They shortened the training time for infantrymen and stripped enlisted men from divisions 
awaiting deployment. They had to make the change to the replacement system, because of the 
demand for new troops after the invasion of France.103 The 45th Infantry Division received 6815 
enlisted reinforcements by January 1945; however, these men received unsatisfactory training.104  
The 45th Infantry Division’s G-1 responded to a letter sent to the headquarters by the 
War Department Observers Board in which they complained about the quality of the 
reinforcements.105  They wrote only about the new riflemen in the unit. They do not know the 
“tactical employment of infantry weapons.”106 They needed more time on the rifle range and 
could not fire the bazooka. The new soldiers only trained to use one weapon and lacked 
familiarization with the machine gun. They needed more training in night operations and 
selecting targets.107 In order to overcome the problems, the division commanders started giving 
the replacements a 48-hour training session before sending them to the front. The new men 
joined a platoon with “a battle-tested aggressive staff sgt. was assigned as platoon leader.”108 The 
platoons trained with their leader for two days and carried supplies to the front lines. This 
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allowed them to get use to “shellfire” without being in combat.109 The division tried the 
procedure over an extended period and “proved to be the best method in the utilization of 
replacements.”110  The 179th Infantry Regiment started the training procedure in October 1944 
and after success, all regiments of the division used it.111 The replacements had weaknesses, but 
the 45th Infantry Division found a way to overcome the problems.       
By mid-1944, the German situation had pushed them from an offensive strategy to the 
defense strategy to protect three different fronts. The Wehrmacht had declined because of poorly 
trained units and piecemealed divisions. They turned soldiers into riflemen who lacked formal 
infantry training. The German Army could not meet the demands of fighting on several fronts at 
one time. Bonn admitted that, “by late 1944, the German army in the west was suited neither by 
organization nor by personnel and training for the execution of its mission to hold back the Allies 
from the gates of Germany.”112 At the same time, the American situation had improved as they 
gained ground in France. They also received adequate replacements that could easily be trained 
by their infantry division to be adequate in combat.    
Bonn argued that, the Germans had fought to hold the Vosges using the area as a natural 
fortress, like many armies before them had done. The Germans instead fought a delaying defense 
in the hopes of a successful counterattack in December 1944. The Americans received decently 
trained reinforcements while fighting in the mountains, while Army Group G received poor 
replacements until late December before OPERATION NORDWIND. The Germans lacked critical 
supplies such as medicine, ammunition of all types, winter clothing, heating fuel, and weapons 
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throughout the four month period. It is impossible to judge the two militaries from the fighting in 
the Vosges Mountains. The American Army faced a German Army in decline in 1944. The 
Wehrmacht did not fight to hold the mountains, but it tried to gain time. It used obstacles of all 
types to sap as much men and material from the Americans as possible before their offensive. 





Chapter 3: Moselle River Defense to the Colmar Pocket: 20 September to 31 December 1944  
 
 In early 1944, the Germans thought very little of the capabilities of the US infantry, but 
found its artillery terrifying and accurate. “Americans do not follow their successes up. The 
Russians over-ran and sealed us in our pillboxes, then returned and wiped them out later. 
Americans must be afraid of losing men; they always stop when they come to an obstacle and do 
not press on until it has been destroyed. But their artillery is terrifying.”1 This underestimation 
helped the Seventh Army in its trek through the Vosges Mountains. The Wehrmacht was over 
confident in its delaying defense and obstacles to halt the American advance in southern France.  
 In late September, Army Group G started the delaying defense at the Moselle River, a 
shift from the mass retreat from southern France. It continued the strategy through the end of 
December. In September, the Germans hastily put together a defensive action that grew 
increasingly stiffer as the Allies got closer to the Rhine River. The Wehrmacht used roadblocks, 
booby-traps, mines, and machine gun positions on hills as part of its delaying defense. During 
the four month period, the Americans did not have a perfect logistical situation, but the Germans 
suffered from a lack of vital supplies despite the close proximity to Germany. The 45th Division 
received adequate reinforcements, while Army Group G received mostly stragglers with poor 
morale. Weather was a problem for both sides; as a majority of their soldiers lived exposed to the 
harsh Vosges’ winters. Armor and aircraft assisted both sides as they attempted to achieve their 
objectives.   
 By 10 September 1944, the Germans had retreated from the Mediterranean coast to 
hastily prepare a defense line along the Moselle River. Army Group G set up the defense line 
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miles from the Vosges Mountains to buy time to prepare their positions in the lower ranges.2 
(See Map 7) It hoped to rebuild its strength in the mountains and counterattack the US Army’s 
southern flank.3 The Seventh Army expected the Wehrmacht “to take advantage of the terrain 
along four major phase lines.”4 Germans setup the first line at the Moselle River, followed by the 
foothills of the High Vosges and the approaches through the mountains. The third line was at the 
foothills of the Low Vosges around the Alsace Plains and lastly the Rhine River.5 “As the Rhine 
was the last natural barrier before Germany, the enemy was expected to make maximum use of 
the defense in depth afforded by the Vosges Mountains.”6 As it prepared the defensive lines, the 
Wehrmacht became concerned by the rapid advance of the US Third Army led by General 
George Patton and ordered Army Group G to attack before further withdrawal.7 Between 4 to 8 
September, it removed full strength units from the Moselle River defensive line. The attack 
started the following day, Patton’s army defeated the German attack within the week and forced 
them back on the defensive at the river.8        
 On 12 September, “the 45th was ordered to capture Epinal and cross the Moselle, proceed 
in a northeasterly direction to take Rambervillers and Baccarat, and be prepared to seize the 
Saverne Gap.”9 Epinal is the vital communication center and transportation hub leading into the 
Vosges Mountains.10 General Black ordered the German Nineteenth Army to hold the city until  
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23 September and then fall back to other defensive positions.11 The Moselle River is 80 feet wide 
with vertical embankments of 20 feet.12The Germans had prepared the river defense by 
demolishing all of the bridges over it. They also heavily mined the approaches to the city, set up 
roadblocks and dug machinegun emplacements on the east bank.13 The 45th Division attempted 
several crossings between 20 to 21 September, but heavy machinegun fire forced them back 
every time. The next day, the division launched a three-pronged attack to take the city.14 On the 
same day under the cover of a heavy rain a battalion gained a foothold on the east bank south of 
the town.15 The Germans guarding the river fell back to new defensive positions closer to 
Epinal.16 Inside the city, the Americans fought bitterly for every inch of ground against snipers, 
booby-traps, mortar and concentrated artillery fire.17 Two days later, the Americans liberated the 
city finding booby-traps and mines left behind by the Germans. On the same day, the 45th 
captured the cities of Girmont and Mossaux without a fight as the Germans retreated on contact 
with the enemy.18 Once securing the river, the 120th Engineer Battalion built temporary bridges 
to allow motorized vehicles, artillery and supplies to cross the river.19 After crossing the Moselle, 
the division entered the foothills of the Vosges Mountains. (See Map 8)   
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 After securing their position on the east bank of the Moselle, the Americans made their 
advanced towards Rambervillers. On 26 September, General Black issued an order for his troops  
to slow the advance towards the Vosges and to hinder the enemy before they could reach the 
main line of resistance (MLR). He encouraged an aggressive defense in well protected terrain 
and no units were allowed to retreat until given special orders.20 From 26 to 29 September, the 
45th found that the Germans lacked a MLR between Epinal and Rambervillers. Instead they 
relied on mobile troops with machine guns and mortars to slow the American progress. They also 
used roadblocks made of fallen trees, with anti-tank mines in front and anti-personal mines, 
along with booby-traps in the branches. The Thunderbirds found that the roadblocks could easily 
be removed using a D-7 bull dozer after the removal of the anti-tank mines.21 The Germans also 
used snipers at roadblocks with officers being their preferred target.22 In addition, they heavily 
mined the roads leading to Rambervillers.23 It took the 45th Division four days to travel the 15 
miles to reach the outer defenses of the city. On 30 September, the Americans met organized 
enemy resistance 300 yards south of their objective. The Nineteenth Army deployed manned 
roadblocks, unmanned roadblocks with mine booby-traps, barbed wire and mine fields. Mortar 
and artillery protected the well dug in infantry attempting to hold the Rambervillers.24 
 The Germans became more aggressive and had better prepared defenses in October than 
they had in the previous month. The two armies fought each other in densely wooded, hilly 
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terrain. The Wehrmacht used hundreds of roadblocks with booby-traps and thousands of mines 
against the Americans.25 “Enemy artillery, mortar & automatic fire as well as enemy resistance 
increased as our troops pushed forward, and strong counterattacks by a strengthened enemy 
became daily occurrences.”26 The Germans set up their MLR along hills and ridges with 
foxholes covered by dirt and logs.27 In the cities, they turned the buildings and houses into 
pillboxes.28 The Nineteenth Army took advantage of the previous month to prepare its defensive 
positions.     
 As a result, during October, the Seventh Army’s advance slowed and daily progress 
became measured in yards instead of miles. General Black ordered his men to hold the 
Americans in the foothills of the Vosges until defensive positions are constructed in the 
mountains.29 Static warfare of attack and counterattack defined the strategy for the month. Rain 
turned the unpaved mountain roads into mud bogs that slowed both sides.30 The 45th Division, in 
October, cleared the Germans from the area around Rambervillers to the Meurthe River.31 The 
Nineteenth Army turned the cities of Rambervillers, Grandvillers and Jeanmenil into fortresses. 
The Germans built roadblocks, mined the streets and barricaded the buildings. It took the 45th 
three days to take Rambervillers and Grandvillers. (See Map 9) The Thunderbirds had to fight 
house to house and use close tank support in order to take the two towns.32 The division setup 
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defensive positions outside of the cities. The Wehrmacht took command of the hills around the 
cities with machinegun emplacements. The two sides spent most of the month exchanging 
artillery barrages on the others’ forward elements.  
The 45th division had placed Jeanmenil under siege after meeting heavy fire from the 
Germans inside the city. 33  On 25 October, the 157th Regiment attempted to enter the town. The 
infantry needed the armor to dislodge the enemy from the fortified buildings. The regiment had 
to fall back out of the town as the spotters in the church steeple called in accurate artillery on the 
advancing Americans.34 Three days later the regiment fired incendiary shells from mortars into 
the city and most of it caught fire. The fire and artillery leveled most of the buildings, which 
forced the defenders to retreat down the main road.35 American fighter-bombers and artillery 
harassed the enemy as they pulled out of the city for their new MLR.36 Jeanmenil was the last 
German strong point before the Mortagne River. The division met token resistance in crossing 
the river and found Army Group G had strong defensive positions on the high ground on the east 
bank of the river. 37    In November 1944, the Wehrmacht had an estimated 13,700 soldiers 
defending the Vosges Mountains.38 Most of them guarded the roads, passes, and trails through 
the mountains, but were in a state of disarray as they attempted to retreat to their defenses along 
the Meurthe River. The Americans’ sought to capture the city of Strasbourg and then cross the 
Rhine. The 45th Division started the month in a line southeast of Baccarat, northwest of St. Die 
and west of the Meurthe River. 39 The Thunderbirds received orders to take the town of  
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Raon L’Etape and then cross the river.40 (See Map 10) The Seventh Army attached the 399th 
Infantry Regiment of the 100th Division to the 45th Division.41  The Nineteenth Army’s mission 
for the month was to hold its defensive line on the Meurthe to the last man.42  
The division found scattered pockets of resistance between the Mortagne and Meurthe 
Rivers. The Germans left behind booby-traps, roadblocks, and mines as they retreated to the 
Meurthe MLR, to slow the American advance. They reinforced positions on hills and towns on 
the west side of the river. The Germans “stubbornly defending key terrain features and 
persistently offering strong resistance at well placed road blocks, scattered pockets of Eny [sic] 
presented stiffer opposition in the Div [sic] of advance.”43 Army Group G reinforced the cities of 
Pajaille and Thiaville with a new Volksgrenadier regiment. It took two days of house to house 
fighting to dislodge the Germans from Pajaille.44 The 45th made it to the outskirts of Thiaville 
and found well defended roadblocks on the roads leading into the city. For the next three days, 
the regiment attempted to take the city and it continued to receive strong resistance from inside 
the city. 45  It used tanks and artillery against the defenders, but they could not force them out. 
The regiment received heavy artillery fire from the opposite side of the Meurthe River that 
continually stopped its advance in the city. The Germans used the steeple in the church to call in  
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precision fire on the Americans.46 On 8 November, artillery of the 45th Division destroyed the 
church steeple, before the 180th Regiment pulled off the line.47 On 9 November, the 45th 
Infantry Division turned over combat operations in its sector to the 100th Infantry Division and 
moved to a rest area in the rear of the Seventh Army sector.48 
On 10 November, General Black issued a new order to the German soldiers holding the 
Vosges. He ordered, “all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were to be 
evacuated to the east bank of the Rhine for use as forced labor. Women, children, and men infirm 
or over sixty were to be herded into relatively safe areas: and each village, town, and city was to 
be completely destroyed as the German troops left.”49 He used SS units for the scorched earth 
policy; however, they lacked explosives and had to rely on fire.50 From 10 thru 22 November, 
the Thunderbirds remained in a rest area to train and receive fresh reinforcements.51 During that 
time the Seventh Army crossed the Meurthe River and took the Saverne Gap.52 By 14 
November, the French and American forces attempted to take the Belfort Gap, but the German 
defenders held out for eleven days.53   
 On 23 November, the 45th Division now attached to the XV Corps took up position 
northeast of Baccarat and far north of its previous position in the line; however, only the 179th 
Regiment moved to the front near the Romanswiller.54 The division received orders “to 
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strengthen protection of the Saverne Gap bridgehead.”55 In order to complete the task, the 
Thunderbirds needed to capture and secure more of the Vosges’ passes.56 The regiment faced a 
“conglomeration of miscellaneous units into those undermanned posns [sic], but resistance in 
that area was broken, although reports indicated that Mutzig would be strongly defended.”57 The 
Germans used fallen trees and booby traps to slow the regiment’s advance towards the city. The 
division moved unopposed into the Mutzig. It faced mines, booby trapped roadblocks, blown 
bridges and machinegun emplacements on hilltops.58 Army Group G relied on small arms, booby 
traps and roadblocks to protect most towns. The division had to fight house to house in order to 
liberate the cities.59 On 26 November, the Seventh Army received orders from SHAEF to not 
cross the Rhine River, but to destroy the Colmar Pocket before crossing river.60 At the end of 
November, the Thunderbirds found the fortified cities of Uhrwiller and Zinswiller. As the 45th 
entered the Uhrwiller, it immediately came under fire from German infantry and tanks. The 
Americans brought up their own tanks to meet the threat inside the town and secured it by 30 
November.61 At Zinswiller the Germans counterattacked at night while the division prepared 
outside of the city. They attacked in full force with armor and forced the 157th Regiment to 
retreat and take up defensive positions in the hills surrounding the city.62  
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The 45th Division started December on the edge of the high Vosges Mountains and the 
Alsace Plain. (See Map 11) It occupied the high ground west of Zinswiller in the wood line of 
the mountains.63 The division received orders to take Ingwiller, Kindwiller, and the railroad line 
between Niederbronn and Mertzwiller.64 The Germans had 9,000 men in the sector to defend the 
passes, but only 5,500 could be considered fit for combat.65 The Wehrmacht during the month 
attempted to hold the American advance into Germany by using the Maginot Line and Siegfried 
Line. The Germans fought furiously as the Seventh Army’s advance neared to the Rhineland.66     
 In the early part of the month, the division found roadblocks, booby-traps, and mines left 
behind by Army Group G.67 The Wehrmacht fortified the cities of Zinswiller, Mietesheim and 
Oberbonn with roadblocks, mines and barbed wire. It also had tanks, 20mm flak guns, 88mm 
guns, and machineguns inside the cities.68 At Zinswiller, the defenders had blown up all of the 
bridges and it took the 45th two days to build a bridge due to heavy artillery and mortar fire from 
the city.69 It took ten days with heavy house to house fighting, with the assistance, of armor for 
the Americans to liberate the two towns.70 Two days later the division made first contact with the 
defenders of the Maginot Line.71         
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The 45th Division found Maginot Line stripped of its former glory; the Germans had 
removed all of the big guns and left only pill boxes that faced the Rhineland. The Germans had 
turned the bunkers of the line into munitions factories.72 The 157th Regiment fought past the line 
on 12 December. It quickly overcame the pill boxes and counterattacks with the aid of tanks.73 
The regiment moved up the railway towards the city of Bundenthal. For the next five days, the 
division cleared roadblocks, mines, fallen trees and concrete obstructions, while facing localized 
German counterattacks.74 On 15 December, the 180th Regiment became the first unit of the 
Seventh Army to step foot into Germany.75 By mid-December, the division prepared to attack the 
Siegfried Line with the objective of the rail line near Niederschlettenbach.76       
The Germans had constructed an amazing defensive system along their western border. 
“The key to the Siegfried Line defenses was the bunker. Thousands of them- most of which were 
twenty-one feet wide, eighteen feet high, forty-two feet deep, with multiple levels, reinforced 
concrete walls, and ceilings up to nine feet thick- stretched north and south as far as the eye 
could see.”77 Machine guns and 37mm anti-tank guns armed the bunkers. Smaller pill boxes, 
trenches, barbed wire and mine fields protected the bunkers.78 The Germans used dirt and fake 
building exteriors to disguise the fortifications.79 “Four years of inactivity and undisturbed 
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natural growth has greatly improved this concealment, and the forts are hard to locate.”80 Bonn 
argued that artillery and planes had no effect on the Maginot Line and the Siegfried Line.81 He 
contended that only infantry had any effect on the line, but the 45th Division found an easy way 
to take the bunkers that took more than just infantry. It laid heavy artillery fire on the area around 
the bunker, while the infantry crawled into position in the trenches surrounding the building.82 
“While all this was taking place, some brave soul, loaded down with white phosphorus grenades, 
would attempt to crawl on top of the bunker and drop a grenade down the ventilation shaft.”83 
The platoon then moved on to another bunker.  
The city of Niederschlettenbach lay inside the defenses of the Siegfried Line. Five pill 
boxes protected the outside of the city and a flood stream with all of the bridges blown leading 
into the town.84 The Americans overcame the pill boxes and heavy fighting inside the city with 
armored support on 18 December. The Germans counterattacked three times in an attempt to 
push the 45th away from the rail line. The third attack supported by tanks pushed the Americans 
back across the stream. 85 The division dug into the hill tops, laid minefields and directed artillery 
fire on the Wehrmacht for the reminder of the month.86 The Germans desperately attempted to 
slow the American advance across the Vosges despite their poor tactical and logistical situation.  
The 45th Infantry Division faced a weakened and demoralized German Army in 
September 1944. Stragglers made up the Wehrmacht units defending Epinal and the Moselle 
River. Army Group G armed the men with carbines and light machine guns. They lacked heavy 
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support weapons around the river. The units defending the city had anti-tank guns and mortars. 
Soldiers complained of a lack of ammo, support weapons and had poor morale. Between 20 to 24 
September, German artillery fired around 15 rounds daily. The Thunderbirds, in comparison, 
fired over 100 rounds daily.87 On 25 September, the SS Police Regiment 19 became the main 
defensive unit in the sector with light machine guns, anti-tank guns and support weapons.88 
Army Group G faced reinforcement problems throughout September.   
Most reinforcements came from straggler companies or filled with foreign soldiers from 
Eastern Europe.89 These companies came untrained as infantry, poorly equipped, and had low 
morale. They lacked the will to fight, as most retreated on first contact with the Americans, and  
foreign soldiers surrendered in mass without fighting.90 “Army Group G was instructed to use as 
replacements men from ground, air, and naval elements that were then withdrawing from 
southern and southwestern France.”91 These men also lacked unit cohesion which is necessary 
for effective fighting units. Many prisoners could not identify their unit or the mission assigned 
to them.92  Most of the German units in September fell into shambles and the situation did not 
improve the following month.  
In October, German units continued to suffer from poor morale for various reasons 
including ineffective reinforcements, lack of supplies and bad communications. The 
                                                          
87 “G-2 Periodic Report, September 1944,” 20- 24 September 1944.   
88 Ibid., 25- 30 September 1944. The exception was 28 September, when the Germans fired 150 rounds as 
the 45th Division approached Rambervillers’ defenses. The regiment had good morale during September. The 
Germans severely lacked artillery ammunition for the last five days of the month and fired just under 20 rounds 
daily. They took food from the local population or found food in abandoned homes.     
89 “G-2 Periodic Report, September 1944,” 25- 30 September 1944. Foreign soldiers came from Poland, 
White Russia or the Ukraine.    
90 Ibid., 25- 30 September 1944.   
91  Pogue, 246. The coastal defense units were marines and soldiers manning coastal defense gun 
emplacements. Most came from the Luftwaffe ground crews and coastal defense units.    




reinforcements came from stragglers that had assembled in Bruyers.93 Stragglers had poor 
morale due to the lack of infantry training and being thrown on the front lines feeling exhausted 
after a 200 plus mile retreat through southern France.94 The 19th Army received reinforcements 
from Germany for the first time since the withdrawal. Convalescents, NCO candidates, marines 
and Volksdeutsche made up the new soldiers coming into the sector.95 Many of the convalescents 
had previously been listed as unfit for front line duty due to their wounds.96 The marines came 
from the broken German navy and lacked any infantry training. Most only had three weeks of 
basic military training.97  
They suffered from a lack of supplies during October. At the start of the month, they had 
a good supply of rifle and machine gun ammunition and by mid- month they started to have a 
shortages of all ammunition types.98 The Germans still lacked heavy weapons and tanks for 
counterattack support that commanders promised to the infantry.99 They lacked winter clothes 
and blankets.100 They also lacked food in adequate supply and most soldiers had to forage for 
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food.101 The Germans in Jeanmenil and a few other units on the MLR did not receive a hot meal 
during the month.102  
Poor communication between the German units led to deaths and low morale. Units 
guarding the MLR did not know the location of friendly minefields. As a result, several soldiers 
became casualties during routine operations.103 Morale suffered when units did not have the 
necessary knowledge for their mission, other than, remain in their foxhole and hold the 
Americans. Many prisoners thought their orders were to remain in their defensive positions 
throughout the winter. General Black’s orders never reached the German infantry on the MLR.104 
The Americans had a better tactical situation throughout September and October.     
In November, Army Group G had 13,700 soldiers to delay in the Vosges until the spring 
of 1945.105 “The enemy fought desperately in the foothills of Vosges and did succeed in gaining 
time to complete defense preparations on approaches to the fatherland.”106 The Germans used the 
tactic of frequently breaking contact with the Americans and forcing them to occupy the ground 
immediately.107 Army Group G’s tactics during November showed clear evidence of a delaying 
defense. The Germans did not have a MLR, but attempted to defend a few major villages and the 
nearby hilltops.108 They left behind booby traps and mines in towns after retreating. They also 
used fallen trees along with roadblocks with and without booby traps to slow the American 
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advance. They blew the bridges crossing the Meurthe River and other streams inside the 
foothills.109 They laid thousands of mines and they used dynamite demolitions as improvised 
mines in the last week of the month.110 The 45th Division faced a severely degraded enemy with 
low morale, poor reinforcements and lack of supplies.   
Low morale led many of the soldiers of Army Group G to desert their posts. Between 25 
to 30 November, the 45th Division alone took 923 prisoners, and mostly deserters.111 “Prisoners 
interrogated pointed to bad health, poor food, continuous commitment, lack of medical attention, 
propaganda pamphlets, difficult terrain, bad weather, and insufficient clothing as reasons for 
their low morale.”112 The Germans also cut morale building factors such as, “mail, recreational 
facilities, good equipment and sufficient rest.”113 The soldiers of Army Group G lived exposed to 
the elements or in wooden dugouts without heating fuel.114 German High Command instituted 
Ersatz morale or fear morale. They brought up SS and police units behind the frontlines to shoot 
anyone trying to retreat without orders. Any German soldier that left that post without orders 
risked their comrades being shot and their families could lose food allotments.115 The Ersatz 
morale did not stop non German members of the Wehrmacht from deserting to the American 
lines. The Germans continued to receive poor reinforcements during the month.  
The low quality of the Volksgrenadier and Volksstrum units in the Vosges surprised the 
Seventh Army. The reinforcements came from three groups, those that had been previously 
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passed up for military service, foreign volunteers and stragglers from around Europe. In early 
November, the 45th Division fought the 951st Volksgrenadier Regiment along with various other 
units. Stragglers, new recruits, convalescents, and veterans from the east and Normandy made up 
the new regiments.116 The unit had “30% limited service, 50% youths (17-20 yrs) and 20% 
veterans.”117 It had four weeks of training, new clothes and rifles, but lacked everything else, 
such as heavy weapons. The 1417 Festungs Infantry Battalion guarded the east side of the 
Meurthe River. It contained “elderly men whose mission is to prepare and man defenses of a 
fairly stable type.”118 Other reinforcements came from the Holland and Eastern fronts. The 
Wehrmacht told them that they were being moved to inside Germany to get rest before taking up 
position to protect the Rhine River. Instead of getting much needed rest period, these men 
immediately took up positions in the Vosges sector after disembarking the train.119  
The Germans lacked necessary war materials in November, despite the shorter supply 
and communication lines.120 They had shortages in winter clothing, heating fuels, medical 
supplies and food.121 They lacked explosives and had to rely on fire in their attempt to scorch the 
earth as they retreated.122 At the start of the month, the Germans had 270 artillery pieces in the 
Vosges sector and from 27 to 29 November they had zero artillery pieces in the 45th’s sector.123 
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Throughout the month, Army Group G relied on the few tanks it had to provide direct fire 
support against the advancing Americans.124 The Germans had bullets in plentiful supply for 
machine guns and rifles; however, few rounds reached units in the front.125             
In December, Army Group G was in a state of disarray as its tactical and logistical 
situation became increasingly worse. The Germans had 9,000 soldiers northwest of the Colmar 
Pocket, but the Wehrmacht only considered 5,500 fit for combat.126 All of the elite units had 
been pulled from the sector in preparation for the upcoming offensive in the Ardennes.127 They 
still suffered from low morale, few supplies and poor reinforcements.  
The German tactics during December showed clear evidence of a delaying defense in the 
final stages. They setup defensive positions in villages and on key terrain features in the high 
Vosges in order to slow the American advance. They setup MLRs at the Maginot Line and the 
Siegfried Line. They continued to use pill boxes, fallen trees, barbed wire, mine fields, booby 
traps and roadblocks to slow the Seventh Army.128 The 45th Division noted that the Germans 
used “local offensive thrust with the dual purpose of retaking lost pill boxes and keeping our 
attack off balanced.”129 They also forced the Americans to advance through the narrow valleys, 
where tanks wreaked havoc on the Allied infantry.130 Army Group G still had low morale that 
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led many soldiers to desert their posts. 131 The Germans went long periods without rest or food. 
The German artillery often fired on their own lines, because of the disorganized MLRs.132 The 
45th Division captured many soldiers that became lost and could not find their way back to the 
MLR.133 Prisoners also complained that their poor morale came from the lack of heavy weapons 
or mail service.134 A Wehrmacht soldier wrote in a letter captured by the Thunderbirds that: 
“There is an awful mess and terrible mixup here at the front; nobody knows what’s what. For 3 
weeks now I have been kicked around from one sector to the other. It’s awful not to have any 
mail from you. The trouble is, the units exist only a few days until they are routed and dissolved 
once more; thus I have no regular Field Post Number, and naturally, the “Change of Address 
Forms” get lost too.”135Army Group G’s logistical situation also contributed to low morale in its 
soldiers.        
 The Germans received the worst reinforcements of the period. All of the units desperately 
needed of reinforcement as most of them had 50 percent troop strength.136 They received mostly 
Volksstrum of elderly and others previously deemed unfit for service. Members of the 
Volksstrum in regular Wehrmacht uniforms guarded the Siegfried Line.137 Prisoners called them 
the “Old Men” protecting the bunkers.138 Their average age was 40 and the average age of the 
squad leaders was 53.139 The Thunderbirds had intelligence on a typical reserve platoon of 46 
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men to the 192th Volksgrenadier protected the bunkers. They only had two light machine guns 
and twelve carbines for the entire formation.140 “In this group are men with artificial limbs and 
one eye. One NCO PW has been discharged previously for rheumatic fever but was recalled into 
service recently.”141 Army Group G also cleared out all of the kitchen staff with the exception of 
one cook per unit. The Wehrmacht in late 1944 became increasingly frantic for new 
reinforcements.            
Army Group G suffered the worst logistical situation since entering the Vosges. Its troops 
only received hot meals near villages, at times going without food for up to three days.142 
Defenders in the Siegfried Line only had four days’ worth of emergency rations.143 Soldiers did 
not have heating fuel to keep them warm and in the bunkers, only the command bunker had 
electricity.144 They went without fresh water and many soldiers became prisoners while 
searching for water.145 The Germans received ample small arms ammunition, but due to the lack 
of transports the deliveries came at irregular times.146 The Germans also had a severe lack of 
guns during December. They used captured Russian artillery and Polish and French machine 
guns.147 Some of the German units had one rifle for every ten men and “some of the men don’t 
have carbines or pistols and are armed with hand grenades only.”148 The Siegfried Line bunkers 
had poorly maintained machine guns. The bunkers had MG 08 water cooled machine guns that 
                                                          
140 Ibid., 17 December.       
141 Ibid., 17 December.       
142 Ibid., 2 and 19 December 1944.  
143 Ibid., 18 December 1944.   
144 Ibid., 5 and 18 December. They lacked entrenching tools to allow them to dig trenches.    
145 Ibid., 25- 31 December.  
146 Ibid., 4 and 19 December. The other problem with the ammunition was the getter frequency of duds.   
147 Ibid., 3 and 16 December.  




had been left there since the construction of the line. The guns leaked water faster than could be 
put back in.149 The 45th Division, during the four months, had a far better logistical situation.      
 The 45th Infantry Division did not suffer from the same problems that the German 19th 
Army did during September. They had adequate numbers of reinforcements to replace 
casualties.150 They received poorly trained replacements, yet the Thunderbirds found a way to 
quickly field train them and turn them into well trained infantrymen.151 The Americans had 
exceptionally high morale during the month. The soldiers had adequate supplies and this did help 
to keep their morale up. They had sufficient supplies of food, water, grease, oil and gasoline; 
however, the Americans did lack several vital supplies.152 They lacked rifle ammunition, which 
had to be flown in to the sector to keep the infantry armed.153 The Thunderbirds also lacked some 
food items, such as daily fresh meat, bread and butter that they had been accustomed to in the 
previous months, but the troops had plenty of field rations.154 The US Seventh Army worked 
hard on getting the supply problem fixed during the month. 
Bonn argued in October, that the Seventh Army had a critical supply situation as 
logistical lines neared their breaking point.155 The Seventh Army kept the VI and XV corps well 
supplied, enough to continue its advance. 156  The 45th Division’s G-4 claimed they had a 
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favorable supply situation during the month, but not as luxurious as the one in Italy.157 The 
division had a good logistical situation, high morale and, reinforcements in adequate supply 
during October. They kept a sufficient level of manpower during the period to remain on the 
offensive.158 The troops received fresh meat for nearly half the month, with fresh bread and 
butter served daily.159 The 45th received enough gas, oil, and grease for the month to keep the 
advance moving forward.160 They had enough rifle and machine gun ammunition, but suffered 
from severe shortage of artillery shells of all types.161 The division lacked winter clothing and 
properly sized boots during the period.162 The division’s quartermaster kept the men’s morale up 
by providing rest camps for the troops. The camps had hot showers, coffee, hot meals and rest 
facilities. It did not have regular clothing exchanges, due to the lack of uniforms. 163 Division 
commanders wanted soldiers rotated off the line and to the rest areas as often as possible.164 The 
men also received daily rations of cigarettes, tobacco, candy and toilet articles that helped to 
keep them in good spirits.165  
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During November and December, the 45th Division had a mostly adequate supply of 
reinforcements to keep the offensive moving forward. During the division’s rest period in 
November, the three regiments received fresh reinforcements and gave it time to train the new 
GIs.166 “The supply situation improved again during November, however shortages of 
ammunition still exist.”167 The Seventh Army continued in its attempt to move supply dumps 
closer to the front lines.168 The Seventh Army during the month also had a shortage of 81mm 
mortar rounds.169 “The over-all ammunition situation is therefore still critical…” but the division 
did not limit expenditures of ammo.170 The division received fresh food and sufficient of water 
during the month. 171 The 45th received enough gas, oils and grease for the month to keep the 
advance moving forward.172 It ran short on heating fuel, but firewood was obtained from local 
sources.173 The division received new winter gear and soldiers became accustomed to their new 
boots during the month.174 Each man received four wool blankets or one sleeping bag and two 
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wool blankets.175 The division encountered several supply problems including transportation and 
winter clothing. The poor weather conditions and bad road network in the Vosges made it 
impossible for trucks to transport supplies to the front line soldiers. The quartermaster procured 
mules to transport the supplies.176 The division’s supply dumps also moved closer to the 
frontlines during the month. It now only took the quartermaster two days to get from the supply 
dumps and back to the frontlines.177 The 45th division obtained vital supplies in good quantity 
that kept the offensive moving forward in December.  
The division’s quartermaster continued providing rest camps for its men during the 
period and the Seventh Army pulled the division off the line for two weeks in November that 
helped keep the men’s morale up. “The Division minus Artillery Battalions was relieved for the 
first time since the landing in southern France for a much needed two weeks rest period in the 
Army rest area southwest of Epinal.”178 During November and December the quartermaster 
continued to provide rest camps with hot showers, laundry services and other treats that helped 
boost the men’s morale.179  
Bonn claimed that armor could not operate in the mountainous terrain and forests, forcing 
the infantry to take the Vosges, but the Thunderbirds used tanks in close support of the foot 
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soldiers. They could operate in the woods with the .50 caliber machine gun removed because it 
could become snagged on low hanging branches and be destroyed.180 They also kept the 
Germans deep in their foxhole and allowed the Americans to approach without being fired upon 
before attacking the foxholes.181 In October, the armor could leave the heavily mined roads and 
follow the infantry into the woods helping to force the Germans back towards the Rhine.182  
They also used anti-tank guns as close infantry support weapons to knock out pill boxes and 
entrenched enemy positions. Anti-aircraft units provided fire support against fortified 
positions.183 During the time period, the Americans had more than just infantrymen attempting to 
push the Wehrmacht out of the Vosges.   
Both sides relied on armor during the four months. Several tank battles took place inside 
towns during December as the Germans brought up their tank reserves.184 During both months, 
the Germans used tanks for direct fire support and for infantry support, when they could not call 
on artillery.185 During the fight for the high Vosges, the Germans used armor to devastating 
effect against the Seventh Army soldiers as they tried to advance along the valley floor.186 
During the period, the Americans used tanks to help knockout pill boxes and for direct support of 
the infantry.187 During the fight for the Siegfried Line, the 45th Division used armor to distract 
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the bunkers, while the infantry moved into the trenches around the bunkers.188 They also used 
armor to remove roadblocks and fallen trees from the road.189 Both sides relied on tanks as 
important tool during the period.   
Bonn argued in his book that, planes had no affect against the German Army in the 
Vosges due to poor weather during the push towards the Rhine River.190 The 45th Division found 
aerial recon photos very valuable throughout the period. The photos helped the division locate 
roadblocks, enemy strong points and artillery positions.191 The division had two types of friendly 
aircraft that flew over their sector; the P-47 Thunderbolt (fighter bomber) and Piper L-4 
Grasshopper (artillery liaison plane). Even though the planes could not fly every day during 
September and October, they had two major impacts on the infantryman.192 “The mere fact that 
fighter-bombers, or eve cub-planes, are flying over the front lines is an effective method of 
silencing enemy artillery and boosting morale of the infantry.”193 These two airplanes effectively 
destroyed enemy artillery. The cub-plane directed the artillery to mark the enemy with smoke 
and the fighter-bomber devastated the position.194 General Blaskowitz feared the American 
fighter-bomber, and argued it had the biggest impact on the outcome of the fighting of 
September.195 They continued to have the same impact into October 1944. During the German 
retreat from Brouvellieures on 22 October, American planes used effective pin point bombing on 
the retreating soldiers. The bombing caused massive causalities and panic in the Germans.196 At 
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the same time, the Germans only had ME-109s over the 45th’s sector for three days on 
reconnaissance missions. They also used the fighters to harass the cub-planes in an attempt to 
keep them away from their artillery positions.197 During this period, American aircraft helped aid 
the Thunderbirds’ advance, despite a few days of flying allowed by the weather.           
Aircraft had less of a role for both sides during November and December, because of the 
weather. The Germans had two planes doing reconnaissance over the front on 3 November, the 
only day during the month allowed for high altitude reconnaissance.198 The Seventh Army still 
relied on cub planes during both months to help direct artillery fire.199 During December, there 
were 13 good flying days.200 Planes helped the Thunderbirds advance during the month with fire 
support from fight bombers and by reconnaissance from the cub planes.201 From 1 to 25 
December, the Germans used aircraft to scout the 45th Division’s lines.202 P- 47s with American 
markings attacked the Thunderbirds on 26, 30 and 31 December. The planes dropped bombs and 
strafed the division’s artillery. The artillerymen fired yellow smoke, but the aircraft still 
attacked.203 The Americans discovered that Germans piloted the P-47s after one was shot down 
by the 45th Division’s anti- aircraft battalion.204 Aircraft still had a vital role during the period 
for both sides despite the poor weather conditions.     
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The weather for the four month period had little effect on the ground fighting; however, it 
did have a limited effect on air support. The 45th could count on having air cover during days 
that weather permitted flying. During the period of 20 to 30 September the overall weather was 
cool and mild. It rained for six out of the ten days, this meant the Americans lacked air support 
for the six days. Forty percent of the month saw perfect weather and the American planes 
wreaked havoc on the German lines.205 They stayed much the same during October, but started 
to turn colder later in the month.206 Only ten days were fit for flying, the rest of the month was 
raining and cloudy.207 During November, the weather was extremely cold and wet the entire 
month.208 Mud plagued both sides during the period, making it harder to get supplies to the front 
and slowing attackers.209 In December, it snowed and iced most days with temperatures near 
freezing every day.210 The ice and frost slowed the American advance.211 “December in Alsace is 
a cloudy month with low ground fog and drizzling rain. On only five days of the month was the 
Tactical Air Force able to give close support to the Seventh Army drive.”212 The only reprieve 
from the weather came during the occupation of villages and bunkers for either side.213   
The German situation declined during September and October, while the American 
situation only improved. The Nineteenth Army supply line shortened as it got closer to Germany, 
but the priorities for supplies went elsewhere in the German war effort throughout Europe. It 
received limited ammunition and had to forage for most of their food. It also got enough 
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ammunition to continue the drive into the Vosges. During October, the division took two weeks 
to stockpile artillery shells.  The Wehrmacht commanders promised armor support for counter 
attacks, but they never sent any to the frontlines until the end of October.  
The German situation continued to decline in November and December as the American 
situation improved during the period. Army Group G’s supply lines shortened as it got closer to 
Germany. Much of the goods came directly from the factory, but was of poor quality. The 
Germans still did not receive hot meals at times and water by the end of December. Both sides 
received plenty of ammunition, but in December the Army Group G ran short on small arms, 
machine guns and artillery. The Germans lacked anti-tank guns and assault weapons throughout 
the two months. Both sides used tanks and aircraft for reconnaissance or to assist in attacks. The 
German units continued to have low morale. The Wehrmacht received poorly trained men 
without formal infantry training. It received elderly and medical unfit soldiers to hold pill boxes 
on the MLR. It also received large numbers of foreign troops that deserted when the chance 
came to them. It used localized counterattacks to reestablish lost MLRs and gain time to establish 
new lines. The Wehrmacht held strong defensive positions in the Colmar Pocket and along the 
Siegfried Line as it prepared a massive counterattack for the New Year, meant to push the 
Americans back into the low Vosges.     
It is clear that during the four month period that the Germans desperately attempted to 
delay the American advance to the Rhine River. They created several different MLRs along 
cities and hills that could be easily forfeited by the defenders. They used barbed wire, pill boxes, 
dugouts, dummy fortifications, mines, roadblocks, and booby-traps to slow the Allies. It would 




Vosges Mountains because of its tactical and logistical situation during the period. The odds 




Chapter 4: OPERATION NORDWIND: 1 to 23 January 1945 
 
 At 1740 hours on 20 January 1945, two bloody and battered men wandered into the 
hastily constructed headquarters of the third battalion 157th Infantry Regiment. These men were 
the only survivors of the third battalion who were able to make it out of the German encirclement 
that started on the night of 15 January. They told their superiors that the trapped companies made 
numerous attempts to break through the German lines, but they were the only ones able to get 
out. They also told them that the companies had suffered at least 75 percent casualties and that 
most men no longer had ammunition. The commanders of the 45th Division made the decision to 
move the regiment to the rear and leave the encircled GIs behind. On the morning of 21 January, 
the entire regiment moved to a rear area for reorganization and training.1 This happened at 
Reipertswiller, France and there the Thunderbirds suffered their worst defeat of the entire war. 
The 157th Infantry Regiment lost six companies during the five days battle.2        
In January 1945, the Germans counterattacked the Seventh Army in order to drive them 
back into the Vosges and prevent the Americans from crossing the Rhine River, the 
counterattack the last part of the delaying defense, known as OPERATION NORDWIND. 3 The attack 
had limited success because the Germans had intelligence flaws, poor planning, logistics and 
poorly trained reinforcements. The Wehrmacht had several flaws in its intelligence gathering and 
planning for the operation. Weather and supplies caused problems for both sides in January. 
Bonn argued that there is no need to extend the study past 13 January, because Army Group G 
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lacked any offensive capabilities after that time, but the Germans had great success after 13 
January against the 45th Division.4 
OPERATION NORDWIND got its name from the 6th SS Mountain Division or the NORD 
Division. The Germans originally planned for the operation to take place at the same time as the 
Battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945), so that the American lines would be 
stretched thinner and cause chaos amongst the Allies. The Wehrmacht figured with the fight in 
the Ardennes, the lines of the Seventh Army would be stretched thin.5 It planned to use the 
NORD Division to reinforce Army Group G on the west side of the Rhine River.6  
The 6th SS was enroute to Germany from Finland during the planning of the operation. It 
arrived on the west side of the Rhine around Christmas Day 1944. The group would then attack 
the Seventh Army with the hope of pushing the Americans back into the High Vosges and retake 
the Saverne Gap.7 The Wehrmacht planned for two Panzer-Grenadier divisions to strike the 
Americans on the left and right flank while keeping a third in reserve. The two divisions would 
encircle the American divisions and the rest of the German units would destroy the American 
units in the center.8 The plan though, was extremely flawed. The infantry would spearhead the 
attack and clear out sections of the road for the Panzer units to attack the American lines. After 
this, the tanks would lead the rest of the attacks and the infantry would take care of the American 
positions the tanks left behind. The operation started on 1 January 1945, because the NORD 
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Division needed time to get in place for the attack. The originally plan had the Germans 
bypassing the 45th Division and leaving them in the circle.9 (See Map 11) S.S. Chief Heinrich 
Himmler later added the objective of retaking the city of Strasbourg for the glory of the Furher.10 
The operation had limited success and the Wehrmacht did not accomplish any of its objectives.  
The 6th SS Mountain Division formed on 12 February 1941, and originally had two 
infantry regiments. It became a full division on 15 March 1944 with members from Germany and 
Norway. 11 It had special training in fighting in cold and mountainous terrain. In June 1941, it moved to Finland and received a new leader 
SS-Brigadefuhrer Karl-Maria Demelhuber. He was disturbed by what he found there.12 He 
wrote, “Few commanders at the regimental and battalion level claimed even moderate 
experience with the ways of modern warfare. The antitank gunners had never fired their guns… 
the division was not ready for combat, despite the men’s high morale.”13 It fought for nearly 
three years in the Arctic Circle fighting the Russians outside Finland.14 It returned to Norway 
after the Finnish armistice with the Soviets, and then moved to Denmark in late 1944 to prepare 
for fight in the Vosges. German veterans of the Norway occupation replaced the Norwegian 
elements of the division had to remain in the country. The division became famous for its 
lightening maneuvers to strike the enemy, by infiltrating the enemy lines with small groups in 
order to strike the enemy from behind and in the front. Its soldiers used skis and snow shoes to 
outmaneuver their enemies. It used both tactics again with  
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success against the Americans.15  
The Americans knew of the operation seven days before it started. The Seventh Army 
knew about the planned counterattack on 24 December. It received a warning from the Sixth 
Army through an intelligence report that stated, “Excellent agent sources report enemy units 
building up in the BLACK FORREST area for offensive. Other indications for imminent enemy 
aggressive action exist. Imperative that all defensive precautions be immediately effective.”16 
The Seventh Army had already started building defensive positions, but after it received the 
message, it intensified the defensive preparations.17 The XV Corps and VI Corps started 
“preparing counterattacks against possible enemy penetrations as well as consolidating lines of 
defense.”18 “On New Year’s Eve General Patch visited the XV Corps Command Post at 
Fenetrange and there warned both American Corps’ Commanding Generals that an enemy attack 
was to be expected during the early hours of New Year’s Day.”19  
The weather during the month worked against both sides, and only the SS Mountain 
Divisions were prepared to fight in the conditions. The temperature during the month never rose 
above freezing. Most of the month temperatures remained at or below 25 degrees.20 Both sides 
lived in dugouts or directly exposed to the weather conditions. Snow storms lingered for nearly 
half the days of January.21 These storms added to the previously fallen snow from the storms of 
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November and December. The soldiers sometimes fought in waist deep snow drifts.22 During 
January, both sides had to deal with snow, ice, mud and extremely cold temperatures.23 Other 
than the SS mountain divisions, none of the infantry units were equipped to fight in the snow in 
the mountainous terrain. The SS divisions brought equipment from its fighting near the Arctic 
Circle in Russia. They also trained to fight in these conditions and had years of combat 
experience in the same conditions; however, the majority of Army Group G’s soldiers had very 
little training and lacked training to fight in the environment that presented during January.24 The 
weather conditions for January favored the defender.  
Weather affected how the soldiers on both sides operated during the month. The 
conditions had changed from December, as the days became colder with more ice and waist high 
snow drifts. Most of the days were cloudy or overcast. Dense fog made visibility poor for most 
of the days during the month.25 Air cover for both sides became a luxury during the month due to 
the weather. Cub planes could not get in the air for most of the month. Infantrymen also had a 
difficult time in coping with the conditions. They were exposed to the elements night and day for 
the entire month. It was difficult for them to wage a successful attack in these conditions, 
because the weather for January, favored the defender. The weather conditions were an 
important factor in the battle especially mixed with the logistical problems had both sides.                  
Both sides had a difficult time maneuvering tanks in the weather conditions of January. 
The Wehrmacht placed a heavy emphasis on tanks for the success of the attack. Due to snow, ice 
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and mud, the armor had to stick to the roads of the Lower Vosges.26 Armor also had a problem 
when trying to navigate the roads, because of the ice. In several incidents American tanks slid off 
the road or became stuck in the snowdrifts.27 In the operation area only four roads ran north and 
south that could support armor.28 The Seventh Army defended these roads against the panzers. 
The weather conditions and small road network limited the ability of both sides to use tanks 
during the month, but the Germans suffered a number of intelligence flaws as well.     
Wolf Zoepf, a commander in the NORD Division during the operation, argued that the 
Wehrmacht suffered severe intelligence flaws when planning the battle and also had leadership 
problems. Army Group G had to use intelligence reports from 21 December 1944.29 Their 
intelligence informed them that a surprise attack could work in the area around the Colmar 
Pocket, because of the battle in the Ardennes. It claimed that the Seventh Army’s lines were 
stretched thin, because of the fighting in Northern France. What they did not know was that by 1 
January 1945, new divisions had strengthened the American lines.30 None of the regimental 
generals or those under them knew of any plans to attack before 1200 hours on the day of the 
attack. The Wehrmacht restricted units from preforming any reconnaissance before the assault, 
because it might tip off the Americans. Army Group G gave the main divisions two hours to 
prepare their attack. German artillery lacked enough ammunition or was not in place to support 
the initial infantry assaults.31 Zoepf argued “the German high command had sacrificed the 
                                                          
26 United States Army, Armor Vs Mud and Mines: 4th Armd Div in the SARR-MOSELLE Area (Fort Knox, 
KY: The Armored School, 1960), 85.   
27 Ibid., 85.    
28 Bonn, 198.  
29 Operation NORDWIND was supposed to take place on that day, but had to be postponed until January 1, 
1945, and during the planning of the operation they still used the intelligence for the original order of battle. 
30 Zoepf, 62.  




benefits of solid intelligence and prudent preparation.”32 These factors led OPERATION 
NORDWIND’S failure.  
The Germans encountered many problems with their personnel during the month of 
January. Most of the units in Army Group G lacked full combat strength, and they were 
extremely battle weary from constant fighting since September. The units that were at full 
combat strength were made up of Volksstrum. They had no combat experience and little training. 
The Volksstrum consisted of boys too young for conscription and men too old to serve in the 
military.33 They trained for a few weeks with their rifle and Panzerfaust. They lacked formal 
infantry training. These men reinforced the Volksgrenadier divisions and thought their duties 
would be guarding bunkers.34 The Wehrmacht also equipped their men with hastily produced 
heavy weapons that that lacked the effectiveness of the older weapons.35 One example is “the 
Jagdpanzer 38 popularly called the Hetzer, which was a low-cost expedient in place of the older 
and more durable StuG III.”36 The Americans could easily destroy this mobile assault gun with a 
grenade. NORD Division was well equipped, sufficiently trained, had combat experience and its 
combat efficiency was excellent.37 Most German battle groups were not ready for the tasks they 
were given during the offensive.  
The Seventh Army added the 70th to the 45th Division’s section to help bolster its 
defensive position. The soldiers of the division had sporadic training and lacked combat 
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experience. Though better equipped than any German unit in the operation the 70th came to be 
known as the worst division in all of the Seventh Army’s defense line.38 The Allies needed 
infantry to protect their lines and placed the 70th in the line even though it lacked support units. 
It had only the three infantry regiments and the 45th supplied to assist it.39 Members of the 45th 
jokingly called the other division the “the American Volksstrum Grenadiers” because of its lack 
of experience.40 The 70th Division allowed for the largest penetration of the American MLR.  
The Thunderbirds struggled to supply the 70th and its division during the month. “The 
supply situation was more critical in January than at any time in the Division’s experience.”41 It 
received hot meals, fresh bread, butter and meat every day. The 45th Division had a hard time 
supplying its soldiers along with the other units attached to the division. The Thunderbirds 
during the month had eighteen different regiments and battalions attached to their own.42 The 
45th Division’s supply staff had to assist the 70th Division, because it had never been in combat. 
The Thunderbirds had a severe lack of winter gear in January. It ran short during the month and 
they could no longer issue wool gloves, overshoes, socks, woolen trousers, overcoats rain coats, 
shoe pacs and jackets. They also ran out of cooking supplies and one-burner stoves.43 “This 
situation was very serious due to the heavy snow and bitter cold.”44 The division had restrictions 
placed on all types of ammunition, because ammunition had to be sent to other units.45 The 
Thunderbirds had shortages in oil, so it had to have used oil moved to a supply dump to be 
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recycled.46 This shortage caused the 45th to lessen the use of mechanized equipment during the 
month. Much of the shortages during the month came from supplying the other division. Army 
Group G had a worse logistical situation than the 45th Division.   
The Wehrmacht had a shortage of food and ammunition for all units. It planned to capture 
American fuel dumps to make up for the lack of gasoline reserves.47 This never happened and all 
German tanks left the sector bound for the Eastern Front on 13 January 1945.48 The Germans 
could not supply their soldiers with enough food. The initial assault troops received half a loaf 
bread with spread, and then told to get their next meal from the Americans.49 As the month went 
on, the German soldiers complained bitterly of food rations not making it through to the front 
line soldiers.50 Some soldiers on the front went for five day periods without eating after breaking 
away from their battalions. By 21 January most were extremely sleep deprived from almost 
nonstop combat on two fronts. The Germans in this pocket thought that their position hopeless 
and wanted to fall back.51 A soldier said of this period. “My memory of the next two days is 
blurred, probably the result of the continuing frost, hunger, lack of sleep and the nagging doubt 
all of us had about coming out of there alive.”52 German POWs complained that their units 
lacked food and had low morale. Shortages in ammunition and winter gear also caused low 
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morale.53 Their supply problems intensified later in the month and forced the Wehrmacht to take 
up defensive positions.          
From 1 to 13 January, the 45th Division’s newly attached units had their first experience 
of the combat with the Wehrmacht, and it ended with the Americans being forced from their 
positions. Germans plan of battle for the operation left the 45th and 70th out of the initial attacks 
until 4 January.54 During this period, the NORD division attacked elements of the 70th while 
Volksstrum units attacked the Thunderbirds. From 1 to 2 January, the German infantry limited 
attacks to probes in the sector. On 2 January, the Americans learned from POWs that a large 
attack in the sector was coming soon, that they were building up their forces in the area.55 The 
next day, the attack came on the western portion of the line with heavy artillery shelling on the 
entire defensive line. The Americans successfully fended off the attacks. The German attacks of 
4 January pushed back elements of the 70th.56 The next day the Americans counterattacked 
throughout the sector. That night the Germans counterattacked again and the frontlines became 
blurred.  
On 7 January the Americans had met stiff resistance and could no longer maintain the 
attack. The 45th received orders to dig and form defensive lines once again. The next day a 
massive attack pushed back the western section of the line. For the next two days the Germans 
continued their attacks, but the Americans held their ground.57 Then, on 12 January, the elements 
of the 70th could no longer take the pressure caused by the NORD’s constant attacks and 
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retreated in a panic. This caused the 45th to fall back to a new defensive position or risk being 
encircled. It could no longer hold the line while being attacked in the front and with the threat of 
attack from the sides.58 Elements of the 70th Division retreated from the line in chaos. The 
bewildered soldiers ran in every direction in attempt to save themselves and get to the new 
lines.59 The 157th Regiment filled the hole in the MLR after the 70th Division had to send the 
313th Regiment to the rear.60  
From 14 to 21 January, the 157th Infantry took on the full brunt of the 6th SS with 
devastating results. On the morning of 14 January, the 157th and the 180th attacked the Germans 
from their new defensive position in an attempt to regain lost ground.  The 157th Infantry fought 
two miles northwest of Reipertswiller and in this area, the heaviest fighting of the period took 
place.61 The initial attacks seemed extremely successful and pushed the Germans back. The SS 
men continued to fall back until evening. Then they counterattacked. A massive artillery barrage 
followed by an intense infantry attack stopped the 45th’s advance. 62 The 180th Regiment fell 
back to its original lines while the 157th dug new defensive lines to counter attack in the 
morning. The 45th thought that the 157th had a good defensive position on hilltops near the 
German lines.63 In the night, the temperature fell way below zero and light snow obscured enemy 
movement. The NORD Division took the opportunity and infiltrated the American lines.64 The 
next morning two companies of the 12th Mountain Regiment completely surrounded the 
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companies C, G, I, K, L and M of the 157th Regiment.65 The Germans had around 200 men 
encircling the 600 Thunderbirds. The Wehrmacht companies in the rear of the Americans dug in 
for defensive purposes to block the Americans from getting relief to the surround GIs.  
Heavy artillery fire pounded the surrounded companies and the 12th Mountain infantry 
attacked from all sides. The 2nd battalion of the 179th Regiment attempted to breakthrough to 
the trapped men of the 157th Regiment. It furiously counter attacked the two companies of 
German infantry, and the Americans finally broke through on 16 January.66 The 45th Division 
decided to send three tanks into the German lines. The tanks reached Company I with the 
supplies, but two tanks were destroyed with Panzerfausts as they returned to the American 
lines.67 The tanks could not carry enough supplies to supply the companies for much longer. On 
17 January, the Germans formed defensive lines around the encircled companies and repelled 
attacks by the Thunderbirds from both sides. The Germans continued the artillery barrage on the 
trapped companies.68 The Americans continued to try and reach the besieged units without 
success.  
From 17 to 20 January the 45th continued its attacks gaining nothing but “heavy 
casualties.”69 On 20 January, the besieged companies made one last ditch effort to fight their way 
to the rear lines, and only two men were able to make their way out of the encirclement.70 On the 
same day the Thunderbirds made plans to airdrop supplies to the surrounded companies, but a 
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heavy snow storm made it impossible. The division shifted the 157th and the 179th Regiments to 
the rear for reorganization. The six companies surrendered to the Germans.71    
The 45th Division suffered its worst defeat of the war at the Battle of Reipertswiller, the 
Germans only victory during the operation. The Wehrmacht strategy for the battle was to 
surround the besieged Americans and use artillery to destroy their defense. The NORD Division 
fired thousands of rounds at the American hilltops making them resemble the lunar surface. The 
massive barrage, quickly followed by concentrated infantry attacks to overrun sectors. This tactic 
was tremendously successful.72 The trapped soldiers lacked medical supplies, ammunition, food 
and any source of water. The 45th estimated that 75 percent of the men were either already dead 
or captured. It reported that the reason it had not been able to communicate with the rest of the 
regiment was because the radio batteries had gone dead. The Thunderbirds warned that the men 
were about to break because the German artillery had zeroed in on them with horrifying results.73 
At the end of the battle, the average German soldier was starving and battle weary, but in high 
spirits. Their morale was high due to the in victory.74 Members of 45th Division remembered the 
battle with horror. Colonel Felix Spark, the commander of the 3rd battalion of the 157th Infantry 
Regiment that attempted to rescue the “lost battalion.”75 He later wrote that, “The most tortured 
memory is of the Battle of Reipertswiller. Seven company commanders, about thirty platoon 
leaders, and some six hundred other valiant soldiers of the regiment were either killed, wounded 
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or captured during this tragic operation.”76 The 45th Division pulled back to a new defense line 
on 21 January. 
From 22 to 31 January, both sides reverted to fighting a defensive battle. The 180th and 
the 179th Regiment remained in the sector with the exception of the 2nd battalion of the 179th.77 
The 6th SS lacked the offensive capabilities to follow up on their victory at Reipertswiller. The 
German supply problems finally affected them and the hungry soldiers could not be pushed into 
attacking the enemy any more. The Thunderbirds lacked the manpower to attempt to regain the 
territory. With both sides unable to attack, they dug in for a defensive struggle with the 
occasional exchange of artillery and small arms fire.78  
The Seventh Army made the decision after the fighting in January to wage a defensive 
battle only in the preparation for a March offensive. This decision allowed them to regroup and 
regain the manpower lost after OPERATION NORDWIND. This permitted time for the winter 
weather to pass and for the divisions to stockpile supplies for the push into Germany.  
Army Group G also had to take up defensive positions due to manpower and supply 
problems. The German counterattack did not obtain any of its objectives, but it did stop the 
Seventh Army’s advance. Faulty intelligence, lack of reconnaissance, poorly trained 
reinforcements, and terrible logistical situation hurt the Wehrmacht in the operation. Weather had 
an important factor in the battle, because it aided the defender. It also affected the way that the 
soldiers fought and helped to hide the movements of men infiltrating the enemy lines. In the 
Battle of Reipertswiller, the more experienced 6th SS were able to overcome and destroy 
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elements of the 157th and 179th Infantry. Keith Bonn was wrong that the Germans could not 
continue the attack after 13 January, because they had their greatest victories of the operation 
after that date, but they could not capitalize on the victory.  
By 25 January 1945, the Seventh Army had secured defensive positions on the foothills 
of the Lower Vosges and throughout the Alsace Plains. It had accomplished something that no 
other army had in history. It is clear that Army Group G was fighting a delaying defense during 
its retreat through the Vosges. It set up several MLRs from the Moselle River to the Colmar 
Pocket. It used roadblocks, barbed wire, fallen trees, minefields and pill boxes to slow the Allied 
advance. In January the Germans finally had strength to go back on the offensive against the 
Seventh Army. They attacked the Americans with the hopes of pushing them back into the 
mountains. They were unsuccessful, but the counterattack forced the Seventh Army to stop 










The Truppenführung outlines the tactics of, and when to use, the delaying defense. Army 
Group G used the delaying defense as outlined in Truppenführung. It used the defense when 
faced by a superior enemy force. It lacked the ability to maintain an offensive and delayed 
waiting for the opportunity to attack in OPERATION NORDWIND. The tactic only works if the 
enemy force follows to the pre-prepared locations, such as the Seventh Army did in the Vosges 
Mountains. The terrain should be used to full advantage in determining the location of the line 
and the fallback positions. The best, defensible areas are mountains and wooded areas, such as 
the terrain found in the High and Low Vosges. Locations that force a narrow column of approach 
is preferred, such as the road system in the Vosges. The Wehrmacht created four lines of 
resistance throughout the Vosges. The lines should force the enemy to deploy early, thereby 
sapping time and resource, which the Germans did during the first three months of the campaign. 
The Truppenführung also states that the defender can use counterattacks to gain back small 
sections of ground and gain more time. In November and December, Army Group G used 
several localized counterattacks to regain back lost ground. The defenders can put up a strong 
defense or can stay out of close contact with the enemy depending on the ability to defend that 
location.  
The lines were further strengthened by the use of obstacles in front of them. The 
obstacles slow down the enemy and allow defenders the chance to counter attack. Obstacles can 
come in all types, with the exception of field fortifications; however, dummy field fortifications 
are extremely valuable.  Army Group G used pillboxes, dugouts and dummy fortifications 
throughout the Vosges and Alsace Plain. It used miles of barbed wire, roadblocks (manned and 




on select hilltops with machine gun emplacements to help delay the Americans. During the 
defense Army Group G picked select towns to fortify and others it cleared out all of the 
townsfolk. In the cleared out villages the Germans left booby-traps, mines and roadblocks. All of 
the evidence from the campaign show clear evidence of a delaying defense.  
 Army Group G lacked the ability to go on the offensive between September and 
December 1944. It received abysmal reinforcements, inadequate supplies and all of its units 
suffered from poor communications. It desperately needed soldiers for its undermanned units. In 
the early period, it had to rely on stragglers, air force ground crews, marines, and coastal 
defenders. All of the groups lacked any formal infantry training. In later periods, the Wehrmacht 
sent non Germans, convalescents, elderly men and young boys from the Volksstrum to the 
Vosges. Many of the foreign troops surrendered in mass when they made contact with the 
Americans. These soldiers had signed up to fight the Russians in the east and not the western 
Allies. In December, Army Group G received exhausted soldiers from other fronts that had been 
told they were being moved to rest camps.  
 The units of Army Group G had poor communication with other units in the army group. 
Several soldiers became casualties after wandering into friendly minefields, because the units did 
not communicate with each other. Most front line troops did not have contact with the rear and 
could not identify their own lines. German artillery fired on their own lines for the same reason. 
During OPERATION NORDWIND, Army Group G gave two hour notice to the attacking units and 
could not do their reconnaissance of the Allies. The lack of communication between the units 




Army Group G’s logistical situation during the period created another problem for the 
Germans. The soldiers went without hot meals unless they were stationed in a town. In some 
cases, soldiers went days without food or sleep while on the frontlines. The Germans lacked 
fresh water, and many soldiers in December became prisoners while trying to find something to 
drink. They had shortages in winter clothes, guns and basic tools such as entrenching tools. They 
received adequate supplies of ammunition, but arrived at the front at irregular intervals due to a 
lack of transportation. In the first four months, Army Group G had a shortage of artillery guns 
and for a time did not have any guns in the 45th Division’s sector. During November and 
December, some German units had a deficiency in firearms. They had one rifle for every ten men 
and some of the soldiers were only issued hand grenades. They went without heavy assault 
weapons and anti-tank guns. In January, the new German units brought these weapons with 
them, but they had severe defects that made them vulnerable to infantry attacks. The 45th 
Division had a far superior logistical situation between September and December.        
 The Thunderbirds received enough reinforcements to keep the advance moving forward. 
The new soldiers came with some training deficiencies but after two weeks, the 45th turned them 
into adequate troops. It received plenty of ammunition during the period. At times, it did have 
shortages, but it did not stop the push forward. During the period, it did run short on artillery 
shells, but the problem did not slow the Thunderbirds. It had plenty of food and clothing with the 
only complaint being, that the logistical situation was not as luxurious as the one in Italy. The 
soldiers received hot coffee, fresh bread, butter, toilet items, candy and cigarettes every day 
during the five months. The troops got at least one hot meal a day, and at times they obtained 




the front line every two weeks. The Thunderbirds did not have a perfect logistical situation, but it 
was better than the Germans.  
 Most historians have overlooked the Vosges Mountain campaign, which allowed Keith 
Bonn to claim that the Germans attempted to hold the mountains and make the assumption that 
the odds were even. He argued that tanks and aircraft did not have an impact on the fighting, and 
the infantry did everything. This is not true. Armor and airplanes had a role in the Vosges for 
both sides. Army Group G fought a delaying defense against the US Seventh Army in the 
Vosges Mountains from the Moselle River to the Rhine River. The army group received poor 
reinforcements, few supplies and had less equipment than the 45th Infantry Division. The 
Americans’ trek through the mountains was inevitable and the Germans could only hope to slow 
the allied advance. The campaign needs and deserves more research; however, it is clear from 
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